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Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm 
Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor, and Gregg Kirchhoefer 
ABSTRACT 
Firms have increasingly moved productive activities from within to 
outside the firm through outsourcing arrangements. According to some 
estimates, the value of outsourcing contracts has been nearly 100 billion 
dollars per year since 2004. Firm outsourcing happens for a number of 
reasons, including to save labor costs, capture the benefits of regulatory 
arbitrage, and take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of 
firm needs. We review a number of outsourcing contracts for evidence 
that contract techniques are used to help modularize the relationship 
between the firm and its service provider. Consistent with what 
modularity theory might predict, some contract terms seem to work to 
thin the interactions between the firm and its service provider, and this 
thinning serves to make contracting for otherwise intrafirm services 
more feasible. Other contract terms serve to help the parties manage the 
fact that inevitably their relationship will be thick with interactions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the practice of “outsourcing” and “offshoring” of 
production and services by firms in a wide range of industries has 
become quite common.1 This represents a change in the 
organization of production in many firms, from inside to outside the 
firm. As such, it challenges theorists in management, economics, and 
the law to rethink some of the accepted explanations that theorists 
have offered about the boundaries of the firm. Why is it that some 
productive activity is organized entirely within the boundaries of 
individual firms, while other activities are organized through 
contracts, either via arms-length market exchanges or by longer-term 
formal contracts?  
Theories that attempt to explain why business organizers choose 
one structure rather than another—governance by contractual 
agreement, for example, rather than governance within a firm—are 
called “theories of the firm.” Among the most well-accepted ideas in 
the “theory of the firm” literature is that productive activities will 
tend to be carried out within a single firm, governed by hierarchical 
decision-making, when the “transactions costs” associated with using 
markets or contracts are higher than the costs of using internal 
hierarchy.2 If this is correct, then the widespread shift among 
 
 1. Data collected by a private firm, Technology Partners International, Inc., indicate 
that the “total contract value” of outsourcing contracts that exceeded $25 million in value 
reached a peak of $96.8 billion worldwide in 2004, and ranged from about $85 billion to $97 
billion from 2004 through 2008. Total contract value was substantially smaller in the first half 
of 2009 as the world was gripped by an unusually bad recession. TECH. PARTNERS INT’L, INC., 
THE TPI INDEX: AN INFORMED VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE GLOBAL COMMERCIAL 
OUTSOURCING MARKET SECOND QUARTER AND FIRST HALF 2009 6 (2009), 
http://www.tpi.net/pdf/index/2Q09_TPI_Index_Presentation.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 
2011). It is too early to tell whether the fall off in outsourcing activity in 2009 is temporary 
and will resume when business activity in general increases, but there are reasons to believe that 
the global credit crisis of 2008–09 exposed vulnerabilities in outsourcing “supply chains” that 
may make the strategy less attractive to many firms. See generally VINAY COUTO ET AL., 
OFFSHORING RESEARCH NETWORK, THE GLOBALIZATION OF WHITE-COLLAR WORK: THE 
FACTS AND FALLOUT OF NEXT-GENERATION OFFSHORING, http://www.booz.com/media/ 
uploads/TheGlobalizationofWhite-CollarWork.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011); MARI SAKO, 
SAID BUSINESS SCHOOL, OXFORD UNIVERSITY, OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING: KEY 
TRENDS AND ISSUES (2005) (discussing outsourcing and offshoring practices by international 
business organization). 
 2. The literature on transactions cost theories of the firm began with Ronald H. Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Oliver E. Williamson developed the idea 
in OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975), and transactions cost approaches to understanding organizational 
design have been a repeated theme in Williamson’s work.  
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multinational companies toward outsourcing—in which production 
activities that had previously been carried out within vertically 
integrated firms are arranged through one or more contracts across 
“supply chains” of different firms—suggests that either the cost of 
contracting has fallen in a variety of settings, or the cost of internal 
governance has risen (or both). 
Yet we understand little about what has happened to change the 
relative costs of contracting and internal governance. Some observers 
have off-handedly noted that transportation and communications 
costs have declined dramatically with the advent of the Internet,3 but 
it is not obvious that declines in the cost of these inputs have been 
greater for travel and communication across firm boundaries than 
they have for travel and exchanges among participants within the 
same firm. 
Another common explanation for increased outsourcing is that 
outsourcing makes it possible for western companies to take 
advantage of lower-cost labor in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern 
Europe.4 But here again, a firm need not outsource to take 
advantage of cheaper labor; it can often lower its labor costs simply 
by relocating its own operations to where the labor is cheaper.5 
In fact, outsourcing to service providers in low wage countries 
might entail substantial increases in writing and enforcing contracts 
 
 3. See, e.g., Pete Engardio et. al., The Future of Outsourcing: How It’s Transforming 
Whole Industries and Changing the Way We Work, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 30, 2006, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06_05/b3969401.htm?chan=gl 
(providing numerous examples of firms outsourcing engineering and design, customer service, 
software development, finance and accounting, human resources management, and other 
information-intensive work to other firms, both in the U.S. and abroad, while managing the 
work flow on new “IT” (information technology) platforms created for the activities). See also 
Manuel Gonzalez-Diaz & Luis Vazquez, Make-or-Buy Decisions: A New Institutional 
Economics Approach, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 255, 256 (Eric 
Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 1990) (“[I]mprovements in information and 
communications technologies make it easier to identify potential partners and to communicate 
with them.”); Charles Perrow, Modeling Firms in the Global Economy, 38 THEORY & SOC’Y 
217, 217 (2009) (explaining deverticalization of firms as due in part to “cheap and rapid 
transport”). 
 4. Engardio, supra note 3, at 3 (“The prime motive of most corporate bean counters 
jumping on the offshoring bandwagon has been to take advantage of . . . ‘labor arbitrage’—the 
huge wage gap between industrialized and developing nations.”). 
 5. See IBM CO., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (2008). While numerous corporations have 
outsourced information technology services and business processes to firms in India such as 
Wipro and Infosys, for example, IBM has developed a wholly owned subsidiary, IBM India. As 
of 2008, IBM had almost as many employees in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (113,000) as 
it had in the U.S. (115,000). Id.   
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given that, in many cases, rule of law institutions in these countries 
are significantly weaker than those in the United States.6 Thus, it is 
not obvious to us that either lower transportation and 
communications costs, or lower labor costs in developing countries,  
would by themselves necessarily encourage outsourcing to offshore 
companies.7 
We do not here offer a completely satisfactory answer to the 
puzzle of the recent growth in outsourcing, but we believe that 
outsourcing contracts can help to inform both the “why” and the 
“how” of business arrangements moved outside the firm. Put 
differently, we believe that the parties’ contracting arrangements 
could reveal something about any such new contracting mechanisms 
tailored to outsourcing, and help us understand the residual 
concerns of the firms involved.  
Thus, we examine the structure and content of a small number 
of contracts that corporations have entered into to govern 
outsourcing relationships. Such contracts constitute written evidence 
of an effort by the outsourcing or “customer” firm to separate out 
production activities along new lines, or in some new dimension, so 
that an outside firm can perform those activities. If the activities were 
previously performed in-house, what are the problems associated 
with separating them out that the customer and supplier firms must 
anticipate and provide for in the contracts? What are the new 
governance arrangements that the parties hope will enable them to 
carry out the work successfully across firm boundaries? And how are 
these arrangements expected to work?  
Specifically, we examine seven outsourcing contracts and some 
associated documents provided to us by Kirkland & Ellis LLP’s 
Chicago office, which has a sizeable practice in the negotiation and 
drafting of outsourcing contracts. Each contract provided to us was 
 
 6. James Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An 
Empirical Investigation, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 342 (2002) (estimating that insecurity 
associated both with contractual enforcement problems and with corruption increase trade 
costs by about 16 percent, and thereby reduce trade); See also James E. Anderson & Eric van 
Wincoop, Trade Costs, 42 J. ECON. LIT. 691 (2004) (discussing factors that affect the cost of 
international trade). 
 7. Anderson & van Wincoop, supra note 6, at 721 (“[I]nternal contracting costs 
within a firm are much lower than external contracting costs. Specifically, the tax equivalent of 
the trading costs of a foreign affiliate of a U.S. multinational with unaffiliated U.S. firms is on 
average 37 percent higher . . . than the trading costs with its U.S. parent.”). 
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redacted to conceal the identities of the parties,8 and each involves a 
U.S.-based corporation arranging to have a substantial activity such 
as business services, data management, or manufacturing performed 
outside the United States by another firm. In each case, employees 
within the outsourcing firm previously had performed the activities. 
And in each case, the contracts were intended to  
govern a relationship that the parties expected to last for a substantial 
number of years.  
We evaluate provisions of these contracts through the lens of a 
theory of production in firms articulated recently by Harvard 
Business School Professor Carliss Baldwin.9  Professor Baldwin builds 
on the notion of “modularity” in production—which is a way of 
thinking about the degree to which activities at one stage of 
production are interconnected with, and dependent upon, activities 
at other stages—to develop a theory to explain where we should 
expect to find activities carried out within the same firm, rather than 
across boundaries between firms. We believe modularity theory helps 
to illuminate how contract structure and terms help both to facilitate 
and to manage the outsourcing relationship. This framework also 
suggests where contracting party tensions may arise in the new 
business arrangements.  
In Part II, we briefly review the theory-of-the-firm literature and 
explain the concept of modularity as it applies to this literature. Then 
we consider how modularization of a production process might 
make it easier to govern the process by contract rather than by 
internal hierarchy, and what characteristics of a production process 
help to make it modular. We further suggest that the contracts 
themselves may help to modularize production—indeed, that 
sufficiently sophisticated contracts may help to offset or overcome 
interconnectedness that arises from purely physical production 
attributes. 
In Part III, we describe some of the relevant terms of seven 
outsourcing contracts. We also describe how various features of these 
 
 8. One of the authors (Kirchhoefer), of course, knows who the counterparties involved 
in each contract are, and provided general descriptions of the counterparties. These 
descriptions are reported in the Appendix. 
 9. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions Come From? Modularity, Transactions, 
and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 155 (2007) (discussing the origins 
of the idea of modularity in organizational design). Professor Baldwin is a leading contributor 
to the theory of modularity in firm organization. 
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contracts appear to us to be designed to help “modularize” aspects 
of production, so that they can more easily be governed across firms 
rather than by fiat within a single firm.  
In Part IV, we offer some tentative observations about how these 
contractual governance arrangements help to reduce the transactions 
costs of outsourcing relative to hierarchical governance. We also 
compare our seven contracts to a larger sample of outsourcing 
contracts assembled by Professor George Geis10 to see whether the 
clauses that we believe help facilitate these outsourcing arrangements 
are also found in the contracts Geis studied. And we compare our 
contracts and observations based on them to an extensive analysis of 
three contracts studied by Professors Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, 
and Robert Scott.11 
In addition, we briefly discuss a few outsourcing relationship 
disputes that have resulted in litigation for insight into unresolved 
problems that some novel contract provisions might present.  
We conclude with the observation that outsourcing contracts 
offer a potentially productive source of insights into the theory of the 
firm, especially theories about the location of the boundaries of 
firms. They also provide insight into the economy-wide factors that 
have been driving outsourcing, and into the effects of outsourcing 
over time on the firms and industries that reorganize in this way. 
II. HIERARCHY AND MODULARITY IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Although economists have been studying the theory of the firm 
for nearly a century,12 neither theorists nor empirical researchers have 
 
 10.  The Geis contracts were assembled to study the extent to which outsourcing 
contract terms are used to attempt to mitigate hold up and agency costs. A discussion of the 
contracts and the study can be found in George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business 
Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. REV. 241 (2010) [hereinafter Outsourcing Transactions]. 
Geis focuses on how the contracts manage “agency costs”—the costs associated with 
controlling opportunism between the contracting parties—a subject he explores in an earlier 
article. George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 110 
(2009). 
 11. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009) (focusing on how the contracting 
parties manage innovation). 
 12. In 1921, Frank H. Knight laid the theoretical groundwork for much of the theory 
of the firm in RISK, UNCERTAINTY, & PROFIT (1921), which was based on his dissertation, A 
Theory of Business Profit, completed in 1916 at Cornell University. Frank Knight, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Knight (last visited Mar. 25, 2011). Coase, supra note 
2, is generally regarded as the first essay to directly pose the question of why some productive 
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reached agreement about the primary factors that cause business 
organizers to buy some inputs in spot markets, while forming long-
term contracts for other inputs, and generating still other inputs 
from within their firm. Most economists agree with Coase that the 
choice of whether to “make” or “buy” an input probably has 
something to do with the relative transactions costs associated with 
each approach.13 But they disagree over what factors cause 
transactions costs to be higher in markets than in internal production 
(or vice versa). 
Some economists essentially assume away the question by 
regarding the governance of relationships within a firm as no 
different from governing relationships by contract—a firm is just a 
“nexus” of contracts, they say.14 Others stress that the important 
difference between within-firm governance and contractual 
governance has to do with differences in the incentives created by 
these two forms. In particular, they argue that relationships governed 
through markets and contracts generally involve more “high-
powered” incentives for the parties to maximize the productivity and 
profitability of each step in the productive process.15 Under some 
 
activity is carried out in markets while other productive activity takes place within firms, where 
market signals are suppressed in favor of “the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs 
production.” Id. at 388. 
 13. Id.  
 14. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (emphasizing the contractual nature 
(voluntary exchange) of the relationships of participants in a firm and rejecting the idea that 
the defining feature of a firm is the authority of the “entrepreneur-co-ordinator”). In fact, the 
authors assert that there is nothing special about the relationship between the managers and 
employees of a firm that in any way gives managers more “control,” going so far as to assert 
that the manager no more controls an employee than a customer controls the grocer from 
whom she buys bread or tuna fish. Id. at 777. See also Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (arguing that “contractual relations are the essence of a firm,” 
and that a firm is a “nexus for a set of contracting relationship among individuals”) (emphasis 
omitted). Jensen and Meckling emphasize the “agency problem” in the governance of 
contractual relationships, in which one party (the agent) acts on behalf of the other party (the 
principal), and the problem is how to get the agent to faithfully attempt to serve the interests 
of the principal. Id. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426–28 (1989), introduced the “nexus of contracts” idea, with focus 
on the agency problem, to corporate law, where it continues to be highly influential.  
 15. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. 
REV. 972 (1994), were among the first scholars to use the phrases “high-powered incentive 
systems” and “low-powered incentive systems” in describing the role of incentives in within-
firm management.  See also Todd R. Zenger & William S. Hesterly, The Disaggregation of 
Corporations: Selective Intervention, High-Powered Incentives, and Molecular Units, 8 ORG. SCI. 
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conditions, high-powered incentives may lead to greater overall 
efficiencies. But where the steps in the production process, or in 
different aspects of the enterprise, are interdependent, high-powered 
incentives can lead parties to engage in wasteful attempts to shift 
costs or risks onto other parties to the enterprise. In such a situation, 
theorists have argued, it might be better to organize within a single 
firm, where managers can use a variety of different organizational 
and reward schemes to try to elicit cooperation.16 
But what factors cause production stages to be interdependent? 
Interdependence can occur when a party to the enterprise makes 
investments in assets that are specific to that enterprise. In that case, 
others participating in the enterprise can take advantage of this firm-
specific investment by demanding a larger share of the profits 
generated by the enterprise or by forcing greater liabilities and risks 
onto the investing party than the investor thought she would bear 
when she made the decision to invest. The party making the 
investment would be vulnerable to this “hold up” by the others 
because those assets will not produce the hoped-for return without 
full cooperation from all parties.17 Thus, Oliver Williamson and 
others have argued that where such investments are important, it 
may often be cheaper to carry out the various steps within a single 
 
209 (1997). Incentive schemes are “high-powered” if efficiency gains in a transaction are 
allocated directly to the participants in the transaction, as would be the case if the parties were 
transacting in a market with their own assets. They are “low-powered” if the benefit of 
efficiency gains affects the transacting parties only indirectly, such as when the parties are paid a 
fixed wage with a bonus that depends only partly on the individual’s efficiency gains, or on the 
efficiency gains of a larger group.  
 16. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: 
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991); 
Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 15; Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of 
the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73 (1998) (discussing the benefits of single-firm 
organization). 
 17. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and 
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119 (1990) (exploring of the “hold-up” problem caused by firm specific investments); 
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); see also Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 482–
89 (arguing that a particular variety of firm-specific investments in knowledge increases the 
“switching costs” for parties in the contracts they study, yet also arguing that such investments 
tie the contracting parties together more tightly, and that the benefit of these ties more than 
offsets the costs of increased mutual vulnerability). 
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firm.18 Within-firm production, in which all of the highly specific 
assets are owned by a single entity, is thought to work better in such 
cases. If specific assets are owned by a single entity that is carrying 
out the entire enterprise itself, then the firm’s managers might be 
able to maximize the efficiency of the joint enterprise, and 
participants will have fewer opportunities and incentives to try to 
push costs or risks onto another party within the entity.19 Implicit in 
this theory is that the potential for costly disputes among participants 
in an enterprise can be mitigated if the participants are all subject to 
the authority of a hierarchical decision-making process within a 
single firm.20  
Management theorists have recently explored a contributor to 
interdependence that stresses technological differences between 
production activities performed within firms and activities carried out 
across firms. Specifically, if the work of an enterprise can be 
organized into “modular” units, then interdependence between 
units is greatly reduced. Indeed, modularity is defined as a measure 
of the interdependence of steps in the production process.21 A 
 
 18. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2; WILLIAMSON, supra note 17; see also Paul L. 
Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988) (surveying evidence from several empirical studies that generally 
supports the hypothesis that investment in specific assets leads to vertical integration). 
 19.  Klein et al., supra note 17, observe that in the 1920s, General Motors purchased 
auto bodies from Fisher Body Co., but when GM asked Fisher to build a plant adjacent to a 
new GM facility, Fisher initially refused. The authors speculate that this was because such a 
plant would be so dependent upon GM for its business. In response, GM integrated vertically 
by purchasing the whole Fisher Body company and making it a captive supplier to GM plants. 
Details of this account have been disputed in subsequent literature on the GM-Fisher 
relationship. See, e.g., Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher 
Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000) (debating the significance of the Fisher Body case); Ronald 
H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15 (2000); see 
also ERIC BROUSSEAU & JEAN-MICHEL GLACHANT, NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A 
GUIDEBOOK 16 (2008) (summarizing empirical findings that “specific investment[] is both a 
statistically and economically important causal factor in influencing the decision to vertically 
integrate”); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: 
The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629 (2007).  
 20. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999) (explaining the role of a board of directors in a 
corporation and arguing that participants in the firm “enter into this mutual agreement in an 
effort to reduce wasteful shirking and rent-seeking by relegating to the internal hierarchy the 
right to determine the division of duties and resources in the joint enterprise”). 
 21. See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, Managing in an Age of Modularity, 75 
HARV. BUS. REV. 84, 84 (Sept.–Oct. 1997) (defining modularity as “building a complex 
product or process from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function 
together as a whole”). The idea of modularity in production was popularized by Shawn Tully, 
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“module” is a component or a step in production that can be carried 
out separately from other steps or components, but is linked to those 
other steps through a common interface that allows it to link in 
multiple ways to more than one other type of component or step.22 
The more “modular” different steps of production are, then, the less 
interdependent, and the easier it should be to govern the 
relationships among parties carrying out the steps by contracts rather 
than by within-firm hierarchical arrangements. For example, 
enterprise-specific investments at related or sequential stages of 
production tend to reduce modularity, while the use of standardized 
equipment, parts, metrics, and processes tends to increase 
modularity. The literature on modularity in production offers a 
useful framework for understanding and explaining the rapid growth 
in outsourcing by large firms. In this Part we briefly review the 
literature on the role of hierarchy in firms, especially firms where 
knowledge is an essential asset (Subpart A), and then we review the 
literature on the problem of modularity and interconnectivity 
between steps in the production process (Subpart B). Subpart B also 
identifies some implications of modularity for outsourcing contracts. 
A. The Role of Hierarchy 
Corporations and other business organizations typically are 
characterized by hierarchical governance. Hierarchical governance 
has been explained as a mechanism for gathering, processing and 
 
The Modular Corporation, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 1993, at 106; see also CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & 
KIM B. CLARK, 1 DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 63 (2000) (defining 
modularity); Bruce M. Kogut & Edward H. Bowman, Modularity and Permeability as 
Principles of Design, in REDESIGNING THE FIRM 243 (Edward H. Bowman & Bruce M. Kogut 
eds., 1995); Melissa A. Schilling & H. Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational 
Forms: An Industry-Level Analysis, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149 (2000) (using logic of systems 
modularity to explain why some industries are highly integrated and others make greater use of 
modular forms); Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model 
of Industrial Organization, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2002) (discussing 
independence found within modular units); Karl Ulrich, The Role of Product Architecture in the 
Manufacturing Firm, 24 RES. POL’Y 419 (1995). 
 22. See John Paul MacDuffie & Susan Helper, Collaboration in Supply Chains: With and 
Without Trust, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST 
IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 417 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006) (noting 
that the term “module” was first used to describe the components of a product, rather than 
the steps in a production process, and that as such, modules are “elements that are 
interdependent within, and independent across” elements); see also Perrow, supra note 3, at 
222 (“[P]arts that must interact with each other in complex ways should be confined to a 
module whose only interaction with the rest of the system is through an interface.”).  
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distilling relevant information, for channeling such information to 
the parties who have decision-making authority within firms, and for 
coordinating an organization’s activities and responses to new 
information.23 Hierarchy has also been explained as a mechanism for 
resolving disputes among participants in the enterprise about who is 
responsible for what, and about how surpluses created by the 
enterprise are to be divided.24 Both explanations are consistent with 
the idea that governance by fiat can help to overcome certain kinds 
of problems that would arise in purely contractual relationships. This 
idea goes back at least to the work of Herbert Simon,25 who stressed 
that the employment relationship is central to understanding the 
nature of the firm. He suggested that a firm is different from a 
contractual relationship in that participants in a firm are employees, 
constrained in their relationships to each other by a hierarchical 
decision-making structure. The essence of the employment 
relationship, Simon claimed, is that the hiring party gets to decide 
the employee’s activities, the production methods employed, and the 
relevant standards for both.26  
Although legal scholars neglected the role of firm hierarchy for 
many years,27 in recent years economists and legal scholars have 
returned to the topic. Blair and Stout, for example, argue that 
corporate law creates a mechanism by which ultimate control over 
important assets and decisions involved in “team production” 
activities are taken away from the team members who are carrying 
out the activities and granted to an internal hierarchy headed by a 
board of directors.28 Blair and Stout borrow Alchian and Demsetz’s 
definition of “team production” as “production in which 1) several 
types of resources are used . . . 2) the product is not the sum of 
separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all 
 
 23. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 263 (discussing the mechanism of 
hierarchical governance).  
 24. Id. at 278.  
 25. See HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957) (exploring the nature of the 
employment relationship). 
 26. Id. 
 27. This neglect, we believe, was due at least in part to the influence of Alchian & 
Demsetz, who argued that the employment relationship is not the essence of the firm. Alchian 
& Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777. 
 28. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 278–79 (discussing the hierarchical structure of 
decision-making authority in corporations). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 12:11 PM 
263 Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm 
 275 
resources used in team production belong to one person.”29 
Economists since Holmstrom have understood that, because the 
output of team production is nonseparable, there is no ex ante 
decision-rule that can allocate the output among the team members 
in a way that gives all of them clear incentives to make the optimal 
level of effort and contribution to the enterprise.30 Hierarchical 
governance arrangements can alleviate these incentive problems.31  
How does hierarchy solve the problem? The theory is that, if 
team members mutually agree to yield control to a manager or 
executive, they are then better able to make credible commitments 
to cooperate and not to act opportunistically toward one another.32 
Corporate law, in particular, facilitates team production, according 
to Blair and Stout—not only by establishing governance by a board 
of directors, but also by creating a separate legal entity to hold the 
assets,33 thereby making it difficult for shareholders, as well as 
managers or employees or other corporate participants, to extract 
assets once they have been committed to the corporation.34 
Holmstrom and Milgrom argue that a firm is characterized by the 
employee (1) “not owning the assets,” (2) “being subject to a ‘low-
powered incentive scheme,’”35 and (3) “being subject to the 
 
 29. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 779. But while Alchian and Demsetz 
downplayed the importance of the employment relationship in resolving problems that arise in 
team production, Blair and Stout emphasize the importance of hierarchy and governance by 
fiat. See supra note 20. 
 30. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982). 
 31. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of a Firm, 113 Q. J. 
ECON. 387 (1998); see also SIMON, supra note 25. 
 32.  The control that a corporation’s executives and board exercises over employees, by 
this theory, derives in part from the fact that the board, and its designees, control who has 
access to critical assets owned by the corporation. Moreover, the employees have opted to yield 
to such control by choosing to work in the firm. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 17; Rajan 
& Zingales, supra note 31.   
 33. See Blair & Stout, supra note 20, at 282–283 (noting that participants in firms 
contribute investments that are then owned by the firm). This is similar to the role identified 
by the asset partitioning theory in Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2001). 
 34.  See Margaret Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 427 (2003).  
 35.  See Nicolai J. Foss, Henrik Lando & Steen Thomsen, The Theory of the Firm, in 3 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 637–38 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available at http:// 
encyclo.findlaw.com/5610book.pdf. These authors credit Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 
16, with this three-part characterization. 
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authority of the employer.”36 These characteristics are 
complementary: a person who does not own assets used in 
production should not be given high-powered incentives focused on 
short-term narrow measures of performance because she is unlikely 
to be motivated to take proper care of the assets if doing so sacrifices 
immediate productivity in any way.37 But if employees are given low-
powered incentives, the employer must be able to exercise authority 
over use of the employee’s time.38 Oliver Hart (whose seminal work 
in this area adopted a “property rights” based theory of the firm39), 
alone and with Sanford Grossman and John Moore, distinguishes 
“employment” from “contracting” in terms of who decides which 
production method is used. In a contracting relationship, they 
observe, the seller chooses the production method, while in an 
employment relationship the buyer chooses.40 
If hierarchy serves the purposes outlined here, then to 
understand outsourcing we need to understand what factors make 
hierarchical decision-making less valuable, or otherwise make it 
possible to substitute contractual governance for hierarchy.41 
B. Knowledge, Transfers, and Interdependence of Production 
Recent work on the theory of the firm recognizes that one of the 
most important assets to be developed and managed within a firm is 
knowledge, or the technology of production. The technology of 
 
 36.  Foss, Lando & Thomsen, supra note 35, at 638. While it seems uncontestable to us 
that these features characterize the employment relationship, we do not believe they are 
sufficient for defining a “firm,” since they would also apply to the relationship between a 
homeowner and a day laborer hired to work in the homeowner’s yard.   
 37. Id. (discussing the reason why the incentive instruments are complementary). 
 38. Id. 
 39.  See Grossman & Hart, supra note 17, at 693–94; Hart & Moore, supra note 17, at 
1120–21. 
 40.  Oliver D. Hart, Coase Lecture, Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm, 75 
ECONOMICA 404 (2008). However, it is not uncommon in outsourcing contracts for the 
customer to specify the production method in rather extensive detail, thus casting doubt on 
whether this distinction is dispositive. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 41. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1 
(2008). In the ECONOMICA article, supra note 40, at 406–10, Hart utilized a “toy model” 
illustrated by a relationship between a singer and a person who wants to have the singer 
perform at a special event. Note that this example involves no physical capital, nor any specific 
assets of any kind. Thus there is no role for property rights in the latest model, and Hart does 
not attempt to explain how the buyer could compel the seller to use one method rather than 
another. 
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production is treated as static, or at least as exogenous, in most 
economic theories.42 Management theorists have studied questions 
about how knowledge is developed and used in firms, but so far, 
economists have done very little to either model how new ideas are 
created and used, or to incorporate those factors into theories of the 
firm.43 But recent work seems to be making progress on these 
questions. 44  
1. The role of knowledge in theories of the firm 
A growing body of scholarship in management science attempts 
to understand the nature of firms by emphasizing that organizations 
have ways of “knowing” things and learning things that individuals 
do not.45 Some of the knowledge of how to produce more or better 
goods may eventually be codified (as by patents), but initially it may 
 
 42.  “It has been a persistent critique that the modern economics of organization 
‘neglects technology.’” Foss, Lando & Thomsen, supra note 35, at 645. See also Érica Gorga 
& Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a 
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2007) (“This literature 
[on theory of the firm], however, has largely ignored one very important variable: knowledge 
resources that firms use in the production process.”); Bengt Homstrom & John Roberts, The 
Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 90 (1998) (“[I]t is surprising that the 
leading economic theories of firm boundaries have paid almost no attention to the role of 
organizational knowledge.” (citation omitted)). 
 43.  Models that appeal to the importance of firm-specific human capital and 
commentators that emphasize the importance of “team production” all accept and attempt to 
incorporate and explore the implications of specialized knowledge—”firm-specific human 
capital.” See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2; Grossman & Hart, supra note 17; Hart & Moore, 
supra note 17; see also Holmstrom, supra note 30; Blair & Stout, supra note 20. Likewise, 
evolutionary theories emphasize that knowledge is accumulated on the job and stored at least 
in part in the “routines” by which firms operate. RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). But none of this work addresses 
how knowledge is created, deployed, and passed from one participant to another.  See Sidney 
Winter, Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1 
(2006) (discussing the difficulties involved in attempting to model innovation or 
entrepreneurship).   
 44. See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 42, at 1127 (“We show that law affects 
management and production of knowledge. . . . We explain the use of intellectual property 
protections, restrictive covenants, and features of compensation systems as responses to firms’ 
need to bind knowledge.”). 
 45. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 43, at 99–107 (discussing organizational 
routines as a mechanism for storing organizational memory); see also Julia Porter Liebeskind, 
Knowledge, Strategy, and the Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 93 (1996); J.C. 
Spender, Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 45 (1996); J.C. Spender & Robert Grant, Knowledge and the Firm: Overview, 17 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 5 (1996); Haridimos Tsoukas, The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge 
System: A Constructionist Approach, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 11 (1996). 
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be “tacit knowledge,” which employees learn as they carry out their 
duties, and know intuitively but have not yet written down. Tacit 
knowledge may also be imbedded in the “routines” adopted by the 
firm,46 which are not necessarily known in their entirety by any 
individual employee, but which can still be carried out by the firm as 
a whole.47 
It may often be the special knowledge that firms possess in these 
ways that enables firms to earn “rents” by generating products and 
services that are more valuable on the market than the sum of the 
opportunity costs of all the inputs. And theory suggests that it is 
because much of the knowledge is tacit and/or encoded in internal 
routines that participants in the enterprise find it necessary to interact 
within a firm, rather than across markets or via contracts. 
Knowledge-based theorizing about firms is in its infancy, and still 
has many unresolved problems. Some theorists have focused on the 
importance of firms’ “core competencies,” for example, and have 
argued that firm managers should construct the boundaries of firms 
so that the firms encompass valuable knowledge.48 Other theorists 
argue that hierarchical governance is important in firms where 
knowledge is important because managers who can direct employees 
can facilitate the efficient transfer of knowledge within the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 43. 
 47. See Winter, supra note 43, at 45 (“Does anybody in the large firm know what’s 
going on? Answer: No. Any single individual’s conceptual understanding of the firm in its 
entirety is mainly at an extremely abstract and aggregative level. . . . But these severe 
limitations on the knowledge of each participating individual do not imply that the firm does 
not know anything very well. For the firm to ‘know’ a productive technique it is necessary and 
sufficient that each individual know his job when the firm is employing the technique. . . . By 
far the most important coordinating and organizing force is the invisible interlocking structure 
of mutually consistent expectations held by the various members of the organization: each 
correctly expects that he will receive familiar signals from the others and will respond in the 
familiar ways.”). 
 48.  Nicholas Argyres, Evidence on the Role of Firm Capabilities in Vertical Integration 
Decisions, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 129, 131 (1996) (citation omitted); see also Liebeskind, 
supra note 45. 
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organization,49 and/or ensure that participants avoid transferring 
knowledge outside of the firm.50  
2. Interconnectedness vs. decomposability 
Another type of knowledge problem arises when the information 
and resources available to different parties to the enterprise, and the 
actions expected of each, are highly fluid and interconnected. 
Suppose for example that participants in an enterprise want to 
develop and commercialize a new technology, such as the next 
generation of gene-sequencing technology. The project will require a 
high level of engineering knowledge of existing technology and how 
it is used in laboratories, what problems the technology has and 
where the bottlenecks are, as well as knowledge of the latest 
experimental methods being used in research laboratories at biotech 
firms, pharmaceutical firms, and universities. Team members will also 
need to be able to project production costs for new machine designs, 
and understand something about the potential market for them. No 
single member of any team of researchers and technicians is likely to 
have all of the necessary knowledge for the project, but team 
members hope that working together they might be able to 
accomplish the task. It is likely that the work cannot easily be divided 
up into pieces that each team member could accomplish in isolation. 
In fact, team members might need to interact with each other 
repeatedly, with some searching for ways to alter different aspects of 
existing technology, others subjecting the new approach to analysis 
and trial by the other parties, and other team members figuring out 
how to automate the process and engineer the machines so that they 
are affordable and reliable.51  
 
 49. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); Bruce Kogut & Udo 
Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 
ORG. SCI. 383 (1992); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, What Do Firms Do? Coordination, 
Identity, and Learning, 7 ORG. SCI. 502 (1996); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A 
Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm—The Problem-Solving Perspective, 15 ORG. SCI. 617 
(2004). 
 50. See Kathleen R. Conner & C. K. Prahalad, A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm: 
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 ORG. SCI. 477 (1996); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the 
Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141 (1988); Gonzales-Diaz & Vazquez, supra note 3, at 
266 (noting that standard theories argue that firms “use vertical integration to avoid sharing 
information about production know-how, customer information, and product or process 
design with other firms”); Liebeskind, supra note 45. 
 51. See Nickerson & Zenger, supra note 49, at 619–20 (referring to the ease or 
difficulty with which a search for new knowledge can be broken up into tasks that can be 
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The fluidity of the discovery process and the interconnectedness 
of team members’ findings, as well as the unpredictability of the 
sequence of steps required in response to each new finding, might 
seem likely to sabotage any attempt to govern such a project by 
formal contract.52 If the project is carried out by employees within a 
single firm, however, the relationships among participants can be 
more loose and fluid because participants can shift the direction of 
their efforts as needed without insisting on writing every expectation 
or accomplishment down and assigning prices or values to them. 
Team leaders can set the direction, monitor assignments, and 
determine the compensation for the whole team and for each 
member.53 Development and commercialization of complex 
technologies is thus a type of productive activity that, until recently, 
was generally thought to be better governed by hierarchy within a 
firm rather than across several firms.54 
Some productive activity, however, may be highly 
“decomposable,” meaning that steps in the project can be separated 
from each other and sequenced, with each one completed or nearly-
completed before it is passed along to become an input into the next 
step. One of us has seen an apparel manufacturing facility, for 
example, where fabric cutting operations were carried out by one 
firm, and the assembly operation carried out by a separate firm. Both 
firms, as it happened, operated in the same building, but there was a 
 
accomplished in isolation as the “decomposability” of the project).  
 52. See Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 459–71 (examining a small collection of contracts 
that govern relationships between firms collaborating on new technology development and 
suggesting that, in some cases, innovation can be managed by contract, rather than by 
hierarchy within a single firm). We say more about the possibility that outsourcing contracts 
can enable firms to manage new technology development across firm boundaries in Part IV.B. 
and note 126. 
 53. Teams can be self-managed as well, though most approaches to compensating 
participants and allocating rents within a self-managed team are fraught with incentive 
problems. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) 
(showing a classic economic model of the incentive problems within self-managed teams); see 
also Louis Putterman, On Some Recent Explanations of Why Capital Hires Labor, 22 ECON. 
INQUIRY 171 (1986) (discussing major theories about why most firms are not organized as 
self-managed teams). 
 54. Harold Demsetz, Profit as a Functional Return: Reconsidering Knight’s Views, in 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 236–
47 (1988) (arguing, for example, that economic actors organize themselves into firms to 
economize on expenditures on communicating and coordinating knowledge, a function at the 
heart of innovation). For the most part, however, economic theories of the firm do not directly 
address innovation.  
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wall separating one firm from the other.55 When projects can be 
broken down into tasks that have little interaction with one another, 
production design theorists say that such projects are decomposable 
into “modular” tasks. Modularization refers to the process of 
breaking apart the various tasks and steps involved in producing 
some good or service into units that are well-specified and self-
contained, but that can work effectively with a number of different 
other units.56 Such units can more easily become the basis for 
organizing production in markets or by contracts, rather than under 
the direction of a hierarchical governance arrangement. From this 
perspective, firms help organize production that is not readily 
decomposable into productive modules, whereas production that is 
decomposable can more readily be organized through markets and 
contracts.57  
Standardization can help to modularize the production process. 
For example, modularization is facilitated when the physical 
characteristics of products and components as well as information 
such as weights, measures, protocols, and programming languages 
are “standardized.”58 Standardization creates common 
understandings about technical and performance characteristics of 
products and services that can be observed and measured by 
independent third parties for purposes of contract negotiation, 
 
 55. One of us (Blair) toured such a facility in the Dominican Republic in the spring of 
2006 as part of her duties as a member of the board of directors of WRAP (Worldwide 
Responsible Accredited Production), which sets standards for fair and humane production 
operations in labor-intensive industries. WRAP officials suspected that both “firms” (the 
cutting operation and the assembly operation) were owned and operated by the same parties, 
so that the division between them may have been somewhat artificial. The separation served 
the function, however, of allowing the cutting operation to be certified as meeting the WRAP 
standards without having to solve all of the labor and safety problems in the assembly part of 
the operation.  
 56. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 21 (“A module is a unit whose structural 
elements are powerfully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to 
elements in other units.”). 
 57.  This hypothesis is in contrast to NELSON & WINTER, supra note 43, who argue 
that firms are repositories of “routines.” We are suggesting that firms can support activities that 
are not at all routine if the participants are willing to yield some control to managers so that 
they do not need to stop, measure, and compensate every transfer. See discussion of “transfers” 
in contrast to “transactions,” infra Part II.B.3. 
 58. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 42, at 1146 (“Standardization is the process 
through which tacit knowledge is made explicit, formalized, and then codified or instantiated 
in physical processes and products.” (citation omitted)).  
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coordination, and enforcement.59 Standardization also makes it easier 
for firm participants who carry out one activity or task to interact not 
only with other units in the same firm, but with other organizations 
outside the firm. Thus it may be possible, or much easier, to 
organize standardized approaches to production through markets 
and contracts, making hierarchy and fiat relatively less attractive.  
3. The role of “complex, interdependent, and iterative transfers” 
 
Professors Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark of Harvard Business 
School formalized the concept of modular production in a treatise 
published in 2000,60 and in recent years, Baldwin has explored the 
implications of this concept for a theory of the boundaries of firms in 
a productive system.61 In all but the simplest production activities, 
tasks involved in producing something are not all carried out by a 
single individual, Baldwin observes. Thus, she says, “it is necessary to 
transfer various things—material, energy, and information—from 
agent to agent in a productive system.”62  
Baldwin distinguishes such “transfers” from “transactions,” 
which are the primary units of analysis under transactions-cost 
theories of the firm.63 “Transactions” are a “mutually agreed-upon 
set of transfers between two or more parties, with compensatory 
payment.”64 “Transfers,” by contrast, can occur in units of any size, 
with no formality, no necessary prior agreement among the parties, 
no necessary measurement and evaluation, and no compensation.65 
Thus the “transactions costs” associated with a simple transfer are 
much lower than they would be for a formal “transaction” involving 
the same flow of information or materials between the same two 
 
 59.  See Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance 
Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008) [hereinafter Assurance Services]; 
Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The Roles of Standardization, Certification, 
and Assurance Services in GLOBAL COMMERCE, IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND RELATED 
DISCIPLINES 299 (Lorenzo Sacconi et al. eds., 2010). 
 60. See BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 21. 
 61. See Baldwin, supra note 9. 
 62. Id. at 163. 
 63. Id. at 164. 
 64. Id. Baldwin notes that Coase used the phrase “exchange transaction” to mean what 
she calls a “transaction,” and he used the phrase “internal transaction” to refer to what she 
calls a “transfer.” Id. (citing Coase, supra note 2, at 393–98). 
 65. See id. at 164–65. 
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individuals. “Tasks” that are carried out as part of a production 
process may involve multiple transfers among the parties working on 
the task, with information and materials moving back and forth 
perhaps many times.66 
Baldwin (following Baldwin and Clark) illustrates the structure of 
such complex tasks using a “task structure matrix” (TSM).67 A 
simple TSM for making and utilizing pot hooks is illustrated in Fig. 
1 below.68 The matrix lists all of the individuals involved in making a 
pot hook in an ironsmith shop, and in using the pot hook in a 
kitchen, down the left side of the grid, and across the top of the grid. 
If any two individuals in the grid will have to transfer materials, 
energy, information, knowledge, or resources between them, an x is 
placed in the off-diagonal square of the grid representing the 
interaction of those two individuals. It is assumed that there are five 
individuals in the smithy part of the operation (S1–S5), and five in 
the kitchen part of the operation (K1–K5). Those who work 
together in the smithy frequently exchange information and 
materials as they work, so all of the off-diagonal squares within the 
smithy subset of the grid have an x. Similarly for all of the off-
diagonal squares within the kitchen part of the grid. But very few 
transfers are necessary or expected between individuals in the smithy 
and individuals in the kitchen. Thus there is only one square with an 
x (representing an interaction and transfer between S5 and K1) in 
either the upper right quadrant or the lower left quadrant. This x 
represents the transfer of the finished pot hook to one of the kitchen 
workers, for use in the kitchen. 
 
 66. See id. at 162 (“The basic unit in the design of any production process is a task.”). 
Baldwin also says that “the primitive units of analysis are decisions, components, or tasks,” and 
“decisions, components, and tasks are more microscopic than stages, but more concrete and 
directly observable than knowledge.” Id.  
 67. Similar matrices used to understand complex organizational structures have been 
called “design structure system[s]” in Donald V. Steward, The Design Structure System: A 
Method for Managing the Design of Complex Systems, 28 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
ENGINEERING MGMT. 71 (1981), and “design structure matri[ces]” in Steven D. Eppinger, 
Model-Based Approaches to Managing Concurrent Engineering, 2 J. ENGINEERING DESIGN 
283, 285 (1991). 
 68. See Baldwin, supra note 9, at 167. 
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Figure 1 is taken from Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where Do Transactions 
Come From? Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 
17 INDUSTRIAL & CORPORATE CHANGE 162, 167 (2007) (Figure 
1). 
In this simple example, we would expect many if not all of the 
exchanges among smithy workers to be mere transfers, with no 
formalities. And we would similarly expect the exchanges among the 
kitchen workers to be informal transfers. In fact, the interactions 
among the smithy workers are likely to be frequent, iterative, and 
complex, in the sense that the workers interact with each other 
frequently and repeatedly. 
A “transaction,” by contrast, requires the parties to define and 
measure the objects being transacted, and for the purchaser to 
compensate the supplier. If every transfer at every interaction 
between any two smithy workers had to be defined, measured, and 
compensated, we can imagine that the process would quickly bog 
down under the weight of the associated administrative costs.69 
But a transaction, in which what is exchanged is defined, 
measured, and compensated, makes a great deal of sense for the 
exchange between S5 and K1. In this exchange, S5 delivers to K1 
the completed pot hook, and K1 pays S5 for the pot hook.70 The 
 
 69. Baldwin refers to the costs of defining, measuring, and compensating a transfer as 
“mundane transactions costs.” Id. at 164. 
 70. See id. at 167.  
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task of delivering the finished pot hook to its purchaser is not 
complex or iterative because it is a one-off transfer, and it is relatively 
easy to define what is being transferred (one pot hook), to measure it 
(including its size, weight, and performance characteristics), and to 
compensate the smithy for the pot hook with money.71 No other 
interaction is required between individuals in the smithy and 
individuals in the kitchen. 
So in this simple example, it makes sense to locate a transaction 
at the nexus between S5 and K1, but it probably would not make 
sense to locate transactions anywhere else in the task structure 
matrix. 
It is not hard to imagine that a task structure matrix constructed 
to map out all of the interactions among participants in a project to 
develop and market a new technology, such as a new drug for 
treating schizophrenia, would be huge, with areas that are extremely 
complex and dense (e.g., the interactions among the biochemists, 
neurologists, and the lab technicians in the laboratory), and other 
areas that are less dense and complex (the interactions between the 
neurologists on the research team and the package designers in the 
marketing department). Baldwin notes that a goal of organizational 
design is to figure out where in a map of all the transfers it might 
make sense to construct organizational boundaries, at the edge of 
which all transfers are “transactions,” and where this would not make 
sense.72 This, of course, is exactly what is happening when a firm 
decides to outsource some activity—it is deciding to construct a new 
organizational boundary, after which subsequent transfers across that 
boundary will be converted into “transactions.”  
The plotting of tasks in a task structure matrix helps illustrate the 
notion of modularity discussed above. In a task structure matrix, 
modules appear as densely connected blocks, such as the block of x’s 
indicating interactions among workers in the smithy. If there are 
only a few, simple out-of-block transfers in such a matrix, then the 
underlying network is highly modular. In many productive 
enterprises, however, the tasks and transfers do not have such natural 
break points. Wherever there are extensive out-of-block transfers, the 
production process is inherently less modular. Places on the matrix 
where the interaction between blocks involves only one or a few 
 
 71. Id. at 167–68. 
 72. Id. at 165.  
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transfers are referred to as “thin crossing points,” whereas places 
where the interaction involves many participants and transfers are 
called “thick crossing points.”73 
The simple insight Baldwin takes from this way of describing 
production technology is that transactions—in which what is being 
transferred must be identified, measured, and compensated—should 
take place at “thin” crossing points.74 Interactions at thick crossing 
points, however, should be managed by a process that suppresses the 
need to specifically identify, measure, and compensate every transfer, 
because at these junctures, the cost of identifying, measuring and 
compensating is too high.75 Instead, Baldwin argues, such transfers 
should be located in what she calls “transaction-free zones,”76 such 
as within a firm, where exchanges and interactions are governed by a 
hierarchy. 
Thus the modularity theory of the firm is that firms exist to 
govern the dense and complex transfers involved in activities and 
projects that cannot be reduced to modules. This theory is obviously 
consistent with, and linked to, the economic literature on theory of 
the firm that builds on Coasian and Williamsonian theories of 
choosing governance structure to minimize transactions costs.77 
Baldwin, however, distinguishes the work that goes into defining, 
measuring, compensating, and otherwise specifying the terms of 
transactions, which she calls “mundane transaction costs,” from the 
“opportunistic transaction costs” that economists have emphasized.78 
In her theory, tasks and transfers are connected in a network, and are 
characterized by how the people involved in production must 
interact in their daily effort to get a job done collectively, rather than 
by how information and incentives can be manipulated to get 
participants to do their jobs.79  
Baldwin’s analysis suggests that transaction costs will be kept to a 
minimum if the boundaries of firms are at thin crossing points, 
 
 73. Id. at 172. “At thin crossing points between modules, there are, by definition, fewer 
and simpler transfers than within modules. Mundane transactions costs will thus be low at thin 
crossing points.” Id. at 166. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 171.  
 76. Id. at 180. 
 77. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Baldwin, supra note 9, at 166, 171.  
 79. See id. at 163.  
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where exchanges can be structured as transactions and governed 
either by simple market exchanges or by formal contracts in which 
what is being exchanged can be readily identified, measured, and 
compensated.80 This analysis seems intuitively useful to us, and we 
believe it helps us explain features of the outsourcing contracts we 
observe. In particular, we will identify a number of features of 
outsourcing contracts that we think can be interpreted as 
mechanisms for reducing the density of interactions at “crossing 
points,” while other features seem to be designed to standardize 
aspects of managing interactions at crossing points that will continue 
to be thick, despite taking place across firm boundaries. 
4. Implications for outsourcing contracts 
Outsourcing contracts are devices for creating a firm “boundary” 
between activities that had formerly been carried out within a firm. If 
the modularity theory of the boundaries of the firm is correct, it 
predicts that contractual governance should be used instead of 
hierarchical governance only at places in the production process that 
are, or can be made to be, “thin crossing points.” These are places 
where “transfers” between parties involved in production can be 
identified, measured, and compensated81—in other words, places 
where transfers between parties can become “transactions.”82 
If this is correct, we should find evidence in the contracts we 
examine that firms have figured out how to reduce the degree of 
interconnectedness among different phases of production in order to 
reduce the thickness of the crossing points at the place where the 
new boundary has been located. We will discuss several ways we 
think this might be happening below. 
But reducing the thickness of the crossing points may be only 
part of the story. The other part of the story, we suspect, has to do 
with finding contractual mechanisms for reducing the “mundane” 
costs of transactions—the costs of identifying, measuring, and 
compensating—even at thick crossing points, and thereby reducing 
the vulnerability that a party faces when transacting at these thicker 
points. Mechanisms for reducing mundane transactions costs include 
devices for standardizing the processes for identifying, measuring, 
 
 80. See id. at 165.  
 81. See id. at 156. 
 82. See id.  
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and compensating what is being transacted. The more the features of 
a task can be standardized, it seems to us, the lower the cost of 
identification, measurement, and compensation, and the easier it is 
for the task to be carried out by one party and then delivered to the 
next party in the production chain in a simple transaction. Fully 
modularized activities or tasks tend to be highly standardized and 
separable from other tasks in a production chain, and as such, can 
more easily be governed by relatively simple contracts. Even partially 
standardized terms can help to reduce transactions costs. 
The parties to transactions at thick crossing points also face 
vulnerability stemming from the fact that each ends up enmeshed in 
the business of the other. To be sure, this enmeshment can help to 
harmonize the parties’ interests,83 but to the extent those interests 
continue to diverge, the thicker crossing points leave each party 
especially vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviors of the other.84 
This problem is intensified at thick crossing points precisely because 
by definition the terms of the parties’ transaction cannot be fully 
specified. Contracts at thick crossing points, it seems to us, must 
include provisions that attempt to reduce transactional vulnerability. 
This analysis helps us formulate several hypotheses about what 
outsourcing contracts must accomplish to be able to effectively 
govern a set of activities that had previously been governed by 
hierarchy: 
1) The contracts must create “thin crossing points” by reducing 
the number of individuals who must interact with each other, and 
the frequency of interaction, in transferring things across the new 
firm boundaries. In other words, at least the significant events of 
contract, including negotiation, modification, dispute resolution, 
and termination, need to be made easier through the creation of 
thin crossing points. 
 
 
 83. This seems to be the argument that Gilson et al., supra note 11, at 459–71, are 
making in their discussion of contracts that govern agreements between firms to co-develop 
new technologies.  
 84. If two steps to a joint production process are interdependent, as we would expect at 
a thick crossing point, each is specific to the other. Such interdependency, Baldwin observes, is 
a form of “Williamsonian asset specificity.” See Baldwin, supra note 9, at 170 (citing OLIVER 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985)). Investment in specific 
assets by parties to a business has been recognized as one of the factors that can lead business 
organizers to vertically integrate the steps within the same firm. See supra notes 17–20 and 
accompanying text for citations to literature linking specific assets to vertical integration.    
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2) The contracts must attempt to specify in advance, in some detail, 
what it is that will be transferred at each crossing point. 
3) The contracts must specify how those things will be measured. 
4) The contracts must specify how those things will be 
compensated. 
5) The contracts must invoke, or arrange for developing, 
standardized methods for identifying, measuring, and 
compensating. 
6) Because the contracts are supposed to govern activities that were 
formerly subject to hierarchical decision-making, they must have 
some sort of mechanism for resolving misunderstandings or 
disputes that will inevitably arise as the parties attempt to identify, 
measure, and compensate transactions in goods, ideas, and services 
that were previously transferred informally. 
7) The contracts must incorporate provisions designed to reduce 
the vulnerability of the parties. In particular, both the firm that 
chooses to outsource its production or services and the service 
provider must find ways to either control or minimize the costs of 
adverse actions of the other party, given their enmeshment. 
III. OUTSOURCING CONTRACTS AND THEIR ROLE IN CROSSING-
POINT MANAGEMENT 
A. Our Contracts 
For use in this research project, the Chicago office of Kirkland & 
Ellis LLP gave us access to a small collection of outsourcing 
contracts with identifying information about the parties redacted to 
maintain confidentiality of the clients. These contracts were all 
drafted and/or negotiated by Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the 
parties in the last nine years. All involved sizeable corporations that 
were arranging for substantial information technology, records 
management, manufacturing activities, software writing activities, or 
call center activity that the “Customer” corporation had previously 
handled internally to be done by an outside “Service Provider” 
organization, usually using personnel and facilities located in other 
countries. Kirkland & Ellis provided us with nine actual contracts,  
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plus several contract forms, appendices and amendments to 
contracts, and hundreds of other related documents.85 
For this paper, we have summarized and categorized provisions 
of seven outsourcing contracts. Five of these were for information 
technology services (including call centers, data management, and 
human resources management services), one was for a software 
writing project, and one was for manufacturing services. The shortest 
contract was 56 pages; the longest was a 77-page contract that 
included 14 exhibits, detailed in another 157 pages, for a total of 
234 pages. The individual contracts and contracting parties are 
described in the Appendix in general terms. In this paper, each 
contract is referred to by a reference number created by the authors. 
B. Thick and Thin Crossing Points 
Many of the outsourcing contract terms we observed seemed 
designed to either thin a crossing point or to manage the fact that 
outsourcing contracts ultimately require that transactions occur at 
relatively thick crossing points. We discuss here a few of the contract 
provisions that (1) help to create thin crossing points; (2) attempt to 
either specify the terms of the parties’ exchange or standardize the 
many procedures under which the relationship will be conducted 
(and accordingly to both thin the crossing points and help manage 
the fact that the crossing points remain relatively thick); and (3) 
attempt to reduce the vulnerability of the parties, given the 
impossibility of fully specifying the terms of their interactions. 
1. Creating thin crossing points 
Several features of the contracts that we examine can be 
interpreted, we believe, as mechanisms for thinning out the crossing 
points. In this first section, we focus on mechanisms adopted by the 
parties to thin the crossing points for significant events in the life of a 
contract, including negotiation and drafting, contract modification, 
and dispute resolution and termination. 
 
 85. Kirkland & Ellis gave us access to copies of nine actual contracts, a “form” for a 
Master Services Agreement, a data transfer agreement, and a contract order for services, as well 
as a large collection of supporting documents, memos and presentations to clients on drafting 
outsourcing contracts, and professional articles. In this article, we focus on seven of the actual 
contracts, although our discussion of these is informed by some of the other materials, and by 
Mr. Kirchhoefer’s direct experience in negotiating the contracts.  The seven contracts are 
described in the Appendix. All materials remain on file with the authors. 
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 a. “Master Agreement” plus “Statement of Work” structure. The 
most obvious way that the seven outsourcing contracts we examined 
for this project facilitate a “thinning” of the crossing points is that 
the contracts themselves are structured in modules. Each document 
we examined is a “Master Agreement” designed to govern the 
overall relationship between the parties by defining a set of 
procedural and default rules that are to apply to a set of sub-
agreements (variously referred to as “Statements of Work,” “Work 
Agreements,” or “Order Documents”) negotiated under the overall 
agreement. The Master Agreements do not specify any actual 
deliverables. Instead they establish a common set of definitions, 
principles, guidelines, and processes by which supplemental 
agreements about specific deliverables are supposed to operate. 
Under the terms of the Master Agreement, these supplemental 
agreements describe work projects or activities in detail, specifying 
deliverables, time frames, standards for quality and functionality, 
control and decision rights, personnel, pricing schedules, and other 
details. Thus the work associated with the Agreement is divided into 
units or components, with the Master Agreement providing a 
common interface between the Customer and the Service Provider 
for each project.  
Importantly, the individuals representing each party in the 
negotiation and drafting of the Master Agreement differ from those 
representing each party in the negotiation and drafting of a 
Statement of Work. Lawyers draft the general rules of the parties’ 
relationship in the former, but the Statements of Work are drafted by 
individuals embedded within each firm with detailed knowledge of 
the specific work to be performed. By breaking the negotiation of 
the contract into modules, fewer individuals’ input is needed at each 
stage, and contract details may be more effectively specified. In 
addition, the Master Agreement can continue to remain in force for 
the parties as new Statements of Work are formed and old ones are 
modified, completed, or cancelled. The modularized structure of the 
contracts therefore contributes to both the flexibility and the 
continuity of the relationship. 
Although the details of the Statements of Work are not 
necessarily standardized, Master Agreement provisions appear to be 
designed to reduce interdependencies among the various projects. 
For example, the Master Agreements include provisions that help 
keep problems and disputes that arise under one Statement of Work 
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contained, so that they do not spill over into the work being done 
under another Statement of Work. One way the Master Agreements 
do this is by providing that both the Master Agreement and any 
Statement of Work will continue to be in effect even if some other 
Statement of Work is terminated. For example, in Document 1.1.B, 
a section entitled “Termination of Statements of Work” provides 
that “[u]nless otherwise provided in this Agreement or the applicable 
Statement of Work, expiration or termination of such Statement of 
Work shall not terminate any other Statement of Work or this 
Agreement.”86 Similar provisions appear in all of the seven contracts 
we examined.87 
The contracts also provide that the Service Provider must 
continue to perform the work associated with a given Statement of 
Work even if funds are being withheld by the Customer over a 
dispute about proper charges for work performed under a separate 
Statement of Work.88 Thus, despite the expectation of a long term, 
multifaceted relationship between that Customer and the Service 
Provider, the contract attempts to divide up work to be done into  
functional or task-related modules and limit interaction among 
different modules.89 
 b. Identifying a small number of key personnel as decision-makers.  
All of the contracts we reviewed provide that each party to the 
agreement is to designate certain individuals to serve as the primary 
decision-makers for their side, at least with respect to some aspects of 
the overall relationship.90 Document 1.2 provides, for example, that 
each party should designate a “Project Manager” for the Master 
Agreement, as well as Project Managers for each Statement of Work, 
and further provides that only these Project Managers have the 
authority to bind the corresponding party in determining whether 
 
 86. Doc. 1.1.B § 3.2, at 4. 
 87. Doc. 1.1.C § 3.2, at 4; Doc. 1.2 § 2.1, at 8; Doc. 1.3 § 4.2, at 13; Doc. 2.4 
§ 16.2(a), at 40; Doc. 2.5 § 3.2, at 11; Doc. 2.6 § 35.2, at 49. 
 88. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.1.1, at 45; Doc. 1.2 § 22.1, at 43; Doc 2.5 § 21.6, at 52. 
 89. In several of the contracts, work is further subdivided within Statements of Work 
into “Service Towers,” defined, for example, in Document 1.1.C. ex. 1, Defined Terms, at 9, 
as “a specified class of Services identified in a Statement of Work as a separate category of 
Services that is related to, but distinct from, other Services provided under such Statement of 
Work.” 
 90. Doc. 1.1.B § 13.1, at 18–19; Doc. 1.1.C § 13.1, at 21; Doc. 1.2 § 2.4, at 9; Doc. 
1.3 § 2.2.1, app.12, at 4; Doc. 2.4 § 5.8(a), at 18; Doc. 2.5 § 17.2, at 26; Doc. 2.6 § 3.1, at 
6. 
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work is being done adequately, in signing any change orders, and in 
resolving disputes.91 Similarly, Document 2.4 provides that each 
party will “designate a qualified employee of such Party to act as the 
primary liaison with the other Party regarding this Agreement and all 
Supplements.”92 
Depending on the nature of the work to be done by the Service 
Provider under any particular Agreement or Statement of Work, this 
structure may allow frequent and extensive interaction and transfers 
of material or information among rank and file individuals working 
on the project, but transactions between the corporations are 
recognized only when the respective Project Managers have 
approved or signed off.  
Disputes that may arise in the course of the relationship are 
similarly channeled into thin crossing points through dispute 
resolution provisions that call for disputes to be resolved, if possible, 
by mutual agreement between identified project-level managers 
representing each party. If not resolved at that level, disputes are to 
escalate up a pre-determined hierarchy of manager pairs (one 
representing each party) to representatives of senior management in 
both companies. The Agreements also provide that no dispute may  
be the “subject of any court action” before going through the 
escalation procedure laid out in the contract.93  
2. Specification or standardization of terms and procedures 
Many provisions of these very detailed contracts are devoted to 
specifying what is to be exchanged and how the parties are expected 
to behave over the course of the relationship. The Master Agreement 
attempts to specify the general structure of the relationship, while 
the Statements of Work focus on aspects of the specific services. As 
mentioned earlier, specification and standardization help to 
modularize the contracting process. Here we discuss a few ways that 
the Master Agreements help to specify or standardize terms and 
procedures. These contract features serve to both thin the crossing 
points of the transaction and help manage the fact that the crossing 
 
 91. Doc. 1.2 § 2.4, at 9. 
 92. Doc. 2.4 § 2.2(a), at 6. 
 93. Exceptions are provided for urgent matters where some sort of equitable relief, such 
as an injunction, is required to prevent leaks of confidential information or another event that 
might cause irreversible damage. 
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points are ultimately thicker than those observed in standard market 
exchanges. 
 a. Invoking or developing standardized metrics. An important 
mechanism for thinning the crossing points involves the 
development and use of standardized metrics for measuring 
performance. Three of the contracts, for example, had the following 
provision: “Service Provider shall implement at its expense, 
Measurement and Monitoring Tools . . . [to] permit reporting to 
Customer at a level of detail sufficient to verify compliance with the 
Service Levels and shall be subject to audit by Customer.”94 
All seven of the Agreements referred to external standards such 
as ISO 900095 series standards or the Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL)96 best practice standards, or the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) standards.97 We also saw provisions that established a set of 
standards or metrics to be agreed to between the parties, sometimes 
called “Service Levels,” by which the Service Provider’s performance 
would be judged. Document 1.3, for example, defines Service Levels 
as “standards for performance, availability, reliability, quality, 
customer service, capacity, speed, timeliness, conformity, efficiency, 
 
 94. Doc. 1.1.B § 8.3, at 10; Doc. 1.1.C § 8.3, at 11; Doc. 1.3 § 8.3, at 19.  
 95. See, e.g., Doc. 2.6 § 13.2, at 18 (“Service Provider shall maintain a quality 
management system (QMS) registered with a recognized third-party registration authority that 
covers the locations and scope of the Services provided to Large Customer. . . . Such QMS 
must conform to the specific requirements of ISO 9001:2000 . . . .”); see also ISO 9000, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_9000 (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (“The ISO 
9000 family of standards relate [sic] to quality management systems and are designed to help 
organizations ensure they meet the needs of customers and other stakeholders. The standards 
are published by ISO, the International Organization for Standardization and available 
through [n]ational standards bodies.”).  
 96. See Information Technology Infrastructure Library, WIKIPEDIA, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Technology_Infrastructure_Library (last visited Mar. 25, 
2011) (“ITIL gives detailed descriptions of a number of important IT practices and provides 
comprehensive checklists, tasks and procedures that any IT organisation can tailor to its needs. 
ITIL is published in a series of books, each of which covers an IT management topic.”). 
 97. Doc. 1.1.B § 8.1, at 10; Doc. 1.1.C § 8.1, at 10; Doc. 1.2 § 2.6.1, at 10; Doc. 1.3 
§ 8.1, at 18; Doc. 2.4 § 3.6, at 11; Doc. 2.5 § 8.1, at 17; Doc. 2.6 § 22.1, at 29; see also 
Capability Maturity Model, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_Maturity_ 
Model (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (“The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is a service mark 
owned by Carnegie Mellon University and refers to a development model that was created 
after study of data collected from organizations that contracted with the U.S. Department of 
Defense, who funded the research. This became the foundation from which CMU created the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI).”). 
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effectiveness and responsiveness that Service Provider shall be 
required to meet,” and devotes an appendix to explaining the 
“Service Level Methodology” by which performance in these 
dimensions are to be evaluated.98 The individual Statements of Work 
under these Agreements provide further details about the Service 
Levels that apply to each separate body of work.  
This effort to define and measure the objects of exchange 
between the contracting parties facilitates the process of transacting 
over, rather than just transferring, each object. Once metrics have 
been specified for measuring performance along the many relevant 
dimensions, this may reduce the need for agents of the Customer to 
supervise the Service Provider closely and continuously. Instead, the 
Service Provider is asked to measure its own performance using 
metrics it devises (or devises jointly with the Customer), and to 
prepare and provide reports to the Customer at regular intervals, 
such as monthly or quarterly.99 This, it seems likely, makes it possible 
to reduce the intensity and frequency of required interactions 
between Customer and Service Provider over the particular products 
or services that are the object of the transaction. 
b. Codification of processes. A substantial number of provisions in 
these contracts call for extensive codification of one sort or another. 
Most of the contracts require the Service Provider to put together a 
Transition Plan, for example, which details in advance how it would 
go about taking over work that the Customer had been doing for 
itself prior to signing the contract.100 One contract required the 
Service Provider to develop a detailed Service Procedure Manual 
“that describes how Service Provider shall perform and deliver the 
Services under this Agreement.”101 This same contract also provides 
that a “Governance and Operations Manual” will be prepared and 
includes an appendix that details a “governance operating model” 
with “four components”: governance organization and staffing; 
decision-making; governance processes; and standard reporting and 
tools.102 
 
 98. Doc. 1.3, app. 11, at 10. 
 99. Doc. 1.1.B § 8.3, at 10; Doc. 1.1.C § 8.3, at 11; Doc. 1.2 § 2.7, at 11; Doc. 1.3 
§ 8.3, at 19; Doc. 2.4 § 3.66, at 11; Doc. 2.5 § 8.3, at 17. 
 100. Doc. 1.1.B § 2.4, at 2; Doc. 1.3 § 2.6, at 3; Doc. 2.4 § 3.2, at 7; Doc. 2.5 § 2.3, at 
10; Doc. 2.6 § 12.1, at 16. 
 101. Doc. 1.3, at 11. 
 102. Document 1.3 was the longest contract, with the most elaborate and detailed 
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Every contract that we looked at provides a procedure by which 
changes may be made to the services to be performed, or to the 
prices to be charged, during the term of any Statement of Work.103 
In Document 1.2, for example, Sec. 3 is devoted to “Change 
Management,” providing that each party may request changes to the 
work to be done under any Statement of Work. Once a change has 
been proposed, the Service Provider then reports to the Customer 
regarding any corresponding adjustments it believes should be made 
to the fee schedule, and further provides that “Parties shall negotiate 
in good faith a reasonable and equitable adjustment in each or any of 
the applicable fees, Deliverables, Services, Schedule, Milestones or 
Specifications.”104  
All seven of the contracts we looked at provided that Service 
Provider must draw up detailed plans in advance for what would 
happen in the event of a disaster or force majeure that caused the 
Service Provider to be unable for some period of time to carry out its 
responsibilities under the agreement.105 These so-called “business 
continuity plans” are required to include some redundancy or 
backup of business in event of crisis. All seven contracts we examined 
 
appendices. Appendix 12 of the contract is devoted to governance and describes the 
“objectives of governance” as to  
(a) provide a set of principles, guidelines and process for the management of the 
relationship between the Parties and the performance of their respective obligations 
under this Agreement; (b) provide for the provision and receipt of the Services in 
accordance with this Agreement; (c) communicate on an ongoing basis regarding 
the purpose and scope of the Parties’ relationship pursuant to this Agreement and 
key Agreement terms and milestones; (d) clarify the decision-making rights, 
obligations, accountabilities, roles and responsibilities between the Parties; (e) 
monitor the SP’s compliance with the terms of this Agreement and the Customer 
Policies and Procedures; (f) provide for centralized governance of this Agreement 
such that all issues or exceptions arising in connection with the performance of the 
Services can be effectively and efficiently resolved; and (g) mitigate risks during the 
term of this Agreement and the associated Termination Assistance Services period 
that would impact this Agreement and the Parties’ relationship. 
Doc. 1.3, app. 12, at 1–2. The staffing structure of the relationship under this contract is also 
routinized and codified to a high degree, with numerous positions specified such as “Customer 
Service Tower Lead/Executive” and “Service Provider Service Tower Service Delivery 
Manager.” Doc. 1.3, app. 12, at 7–8. To an outside observer, the level of detail in the contract 
seems cumbersome. In fact, it appears to try to emulate and specify what would be default 
arrangements of governance within a single firm. 
 103. Doc. 1.1.B § 5.3, at 6; Doc 1.1.C § 5.3, at 6; Doc. 1.2 § 3.1, at 12; Doc. 1.3 § 
10.1, at 20; Doc. 2.4 § 3.3, at 8; Doc. 2.5 § 5.1, at 13; Doc. 2.6 § 11.1, at 13. 
 104. Doc. 1.2 § 3, at 12. 
 105. Doc. 1.1.B § 9.1, at 11; Doc. 1.1.C § 9.1, at 12; Doc. 1.2 § 19.4, at 40; Doc. 1.3 
§ 20.5.2, at 52; Doc. 2.4 § 17.6, at 45; Doc. 2.5 § 13.1, at 21; Doc. 2.6 § 23, at 30. 
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also provide for the Customer to have priority rights relative to other 
customers of the service provider in the event of broad-based 
failure.106 
 c. Periodic (rather than continuous) evaluation of performance 
against standards. Most of the contracts we looked at provided for 
several different approaches to evaluating performance. Development 
of “Service Levels,” discussed above, is one approach. Another 
approach referred to in the Agreements is a process called 
“Acceptance” by which the Customer determines whether work 
completed by the Service Provider is satisfactory. Document 1.2 
defines “Acceptance Testing” as “(i) testing or review, and (ii) 
approval of Deliverables performed by Customer (whether with or 
without the participation of Service Provider) in accordance with the 
requirements of a specific Statement of Work to determine whether 
the applicable Deliverables comply with the Specifications and 
requirements set forth in this Agreement and such Standard of 
Work.”107 The “Acceptance” process formalizes that the deliverable 
has been transferred to the Customer and is satisfactory. Once 
compensation is paid to the Service Provider, the transaction is 
complete. In this way, the Customer does not monitor the Service 
Provider continuously, but only examines and tests the completed 
tasks. But the fact that acceptance testing occurs at various phases of 
the project is designed to give the Customer some assurance that the 
work performed under the contract is proceeding forward at an 
acceptable pace and quality. 
Some of the contracts provide for periodic “benchmarking,” in 
which the Customer hires a third party knowledgeable in the 
industry to review the package of services that the Service Provider is 
providing, the quality and performance levels of the services, and the 
structure of pricing for the services.108 The “Benchmarker” then 
prepares a report that compares the package with what the 
Benchmarker believes other service providers are doing, at what 
prices, for similarly-situated customers. Of the contracts we reviewed, 
Document 1.3 provided the most detail about the benchmarking 
process. Appendix 7 to this document provides that “Customer, 
 
 106. Doc. 1.1.B § 9.1, at 11; Doc. 1.1.C § 9.2, at 13; Doc. 1.2 § 19.14, at 40; Doc. 1.3 
§ 20.5.2, at 52; Doc. 2.4 § 17.7, at 40; Doc. 2.5 § 13.1, at 21; Doc. 2.6 § 23, at 30. 
 107. Doc. 1.2 § 1, at 1–2. 
 108. Doc. 1.1.B § 19.2, at 35; Doc. 1.1.C § 19.2, at 37–38; Doc. 1.3 § 9, at 20. 
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Service Provider and Benchmarker are to agree on the methodology 
that will be used to conduct or support the specific Benchmarking 
Process and the normalization processes that will be applied.”109 The 
Benchmarker is to compare the Service Provider’s performance in 
delivering the services to the performance of a panel of comparable 
service providers, and Service Provider is required “to bring its 
Charges within the top quartile” of the representative sample 
(“viewed from the perspective most beneficial to the Customer”).110 
Under this Agreement, the Customer has the right “to benchmark 
any one or more Service Towers or any one or more components of 
the Services within a Service Tower” at least once each year, and if 
the benchmarking process indicates that the Customer is not getting 
a deal that places it in the top quartile of the control group, the 
Agreement provides grounds for the Customer to terminate the 
relevant services with 90 days’ notice (subject to payment of 
termination charges).111 The contracts also all provide that the 
Service Providers would be subject to various financial, operational,  
security, and data management audits, usually at least once per 
year.112  
Benchmarking and auditing provide ways for the Customer to 
apply a standardized measure of performance at periodic intervals 
without continuously monitoring the performance of the Service 
Provider. But they also serve to reduce the vulnerability of the 
Customer, which wants assurance that the Service Provider continues 
to deliver value to it. 
3. Management of thick crossing points  
While some features of the contracts seem designed to reduce 
the interdependencies between stages of production and the required 
interactions between agents of the two parties, others seem to 
anticipate that the parties will nonetheless be extensively enmeshed 
in one another’s business. Other features in the contracts provide 
mechanisms for managing that interface. We focus here on at least 
two categories of contract terms that seem to be about managing the 
 
 109. Doc. 1.3 § 35, app. 7, at 2. 
 110. Doc. 1.3 § 6.2, at 4. 
 111. Doc. 1.3 § 3.1, app. 7, at 1. 
 112. Doc. 1.1.B § 11.2, at 13–14; Doc. 1.1.C § 11.2, at 15–16; Doc. 1.2 § 10, at 27–
28; Doc. 1.3 § 6.5, at 15; Doc. 2.4 § 5.7, at 17–18; Doc. 2.5 § 20, at 34–35; Doc. 2.6 § 19.2, 
at 26. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 12:11 PM 
263 Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm 
 299 
relationship at what Baldwin would probably call a “thick crossing 
point”: control rights and termination provisions. 
 a. Customer control over Service Provider personnel. Every contract 
we examined gave substantial control rights to the Customer over 
personnel decisions by the Service Provider. A typical clause provides 
that both parties are to designate individuals who are considered 
“Key Personnel,” and that “Service Provider shall not reassign or 
remove any such Key Personnel for eighteen (18) months from the 
date that such person is designated as Key Personnel, without prior 
express consent of Customer.”113 In every contract, the Customer 
was given the right to ask the Service Provider to remove an 
individual from the project along with the right of refusal for any 
new individuals the Service Provider wants to assign to the 
account.114 Several of the contracts provided that the Customer 
could give directions to Service Provider personnel. Document 1.1.B 
was quite specific about this, providing that Customer could deploy 
its own employees to “assist in, or oversee, the provision of the 
Services,” and could issue instructions to Service Provider employees 
regarding “choice of methodology or approach to providing the 
Services . . . instructions concerning compliance with applicable 
Laws . . . [and] instructions concerning processing of Customer 
Personal Data.”115 
These provisions highlight the fact that the outsourcing 
relationship is something of a hybrid—formally governed by 
contract, but with characteristics such as customer control over 
personnel and process decisions that theorists have associated with 
within-firm governance. Each of the contracts, however, included 
very specific provisions to the effect that employees of the Service 
Provider are not in any way to be regarded as employees of the 
Customer.116 Document 1.2, for example, provides that:  
Service Provider and Customer are not joint employers, a single 
employer, associated employers or related employers for any 
 
 113. Doc. 1.3, at 22. 
 114. Doc. 2.4, at 15, for example, provides that if Customer objects to some employee 
being assigned as “Key Personnel,” then “Supplier will not assign the individual to that 
position.”  
 115. Doc. 1.1.B § 13.7.1, at 21. 
 116. Doc. 1.1.A § 4.3, at 4; Doc. 1.1.B § 4.3, at 5; Doc. 1.1.C § 4.3, at 5; Doc. 1.2 
§ 4.8, at 15; Doc. 1.3 § 3.3, at 12; Doc. 2.4 § 4.2, at 14; Doc. 2.5 § 4.2, at 12; Doc. 2.6 § 
20.3, at 27; Doc. 2.7 § 5.2, at 15. 
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purposes under this Agreement or otherwise . . . . [and] Service 
Provider shall require all Personnel to sign an agreement in a form 
designated by Customer under which such Personnel shall (i) 
affirm they are not employees of Customer for any purpose and 
that they shall not exercise any right or seek any benefit accruing to 
the regular employees of Customer . . . .117 
 b. Termination provisions. All of the contracts that we examined 
significantly limit the right of the Supplier or Service Provider to 
terminate the contract.118 The limits on termination seem to be 
designed to protect the Customer once the Customer gives up its in-
house capability to carry out the work itself and becomes dependent 
upon the Service Provider for those services. Document 1.3, for 
example, provides that the Customer may terminate the agreement 
for convenience after the agreement has been in effect for as little as 
one year, but must provide 180 days’ notice and pay a termination 
charge.119 The Service Provider, by contrast, may not terminate for 
convenience for at least ten years, and then must still provide 180 
days’ notice.120 Moreover, even if the Service Provider terminates the 
agreement for convenience according to the contract, it may still not 
terminate any Work Agreement that is still in effect, and the Master 
Agreement continues to apply to those Work Agreements until they 
are no longer in effect.121 
If the Customer terminates for convenience, it must pay a 
termination charge, but if the Service Provider terminates for 
convenience, the contract provides that the Customer may “hire 
those employees of Service Provider and Service Provider’s affiliates 
who were substantially dedicated to providing the Services [and] 
who wish to be hired” and “take assignment of contracts and licenses 
used and entered into exclusively to provide the Services.”122 
Document 2.6 is even more restrictive for the Service Provider. 
While the contract provides a long list of reasons why Customer may 
terminate for cause (breach, unsuccessful Implementation Plan, 
 
 117. Doc. 1.2, at 15. 
 118. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.2, at 46; Doc 1.1.C § 24.2, at 48; Doc. 1.2 §§ 11.4, 11.6, at 28; 
Doc. 1.3 § 23.2, at 66; Doc. 2.4 § 16.3, at 41; Doc. 2.5 § 28.5, at 51; Doc. 2.6 § 36.3(a), at 
51. 
 119. Doc. 1.3 § 23.1.1, at 55. 
 120. Id. § 23.2.1, at 60. 
 121. Doc. 1.3, at 55. 
 122. Doc. 1.3, at 62. 
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failure of Critical Service Level Event, Service Provider liability 
exceeding some cap, change of control, bankruptcy or insolvency, or 
occurrence of a force majeure event in which Service Provider is 
unable to restore service quickly enough), the contract provides that 
Service Provider may terminate for cause only if Customer is more 
than 90 days late in paying, has been notified that it is late, has been 
given 60 more days to pay after such notice, and the Service Provider 
has exhausted the internal dispute resolution process.123 Service 
Provider may not terminate for cause for any other reason. 
All seven of the contracts also provide that, upon termination, 
regardless of the reason for termination, Service Provider will be 
required to provide “termination assistance” for up to six months.124 
Termination assistance may include training the customer’s own 
personnel to do the work, or even training the personnel of a new 
service provider hired to carry out the services.125 
These contractual features may simply be evidence that the 
Customers in the contracts we examined have substantial market 
power relative to the Service Provider. But some of the service 
providers in the contracts we reviewed are large, well-established, 
U.S.-based corporations that did not have to accept stringent terms 
to get the business. Thus we are inclined to believe that the 
termination assistance provisions reflect a need on the part of the 
outsourcing corporation to manage and mitigate the effect of the 
fact that it will become dependent upon the service provider to carry 
out activities that are critical to its business. 
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND COMPARISONS 
A. Outsourcing Contracts and Transactions Costs 
Outsourcing could prove beneficial to firms for many reasons. 
Some firms hope to evade regulatory burdens, some hope to capture 
the gains from economies of scale that specialized service providers 
might be able to achieve in the provision of specific services, and still 
others simply want to reduce the costs of doing business by 
outsourcing work to a firm that knows the local government and 
 
 123. Doc. 2.6, at 49–53. 
 124. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.11, at 48; Doc. 1.1.C § 24.11, at 50; Doc. 1.2 § 11.8, at 29; Doc. 
1.3 § 23.4, at 61–62; Doc. 2.4 § 16.5(b), at 41; Doc. 2.5 § 28.6, at 52; Doc. 2.6 § 36.7, at 
53. 
 125. Doc. 1.1.B § 24.11, at 48; Doc. 2.5 § 28.6, at 52; Doc. 2.6 § 36.7, at 53. 
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markets better. Whatever their reasons for wanting to outsource 
some activity, customer and supplier firms must be able to deploy 
fairly sophisticated contracting technology in order to manage the 
complex relationships that result when new boundaries between 
firms are inserted in places that had been “thick crossing points” 
within a single firm. 
The contracting technology that we see in evidence in the seven 
contracts we examined has evolved substantially over time, and 
continues to evolve. As this technology improves, and as more firms 
gain experience with the types of arrangements discussed above, this 
may facilitate further growth in outsourcing. While this evolution in 
contracting technology might not be the primary explanation for the 
growth in outsourcing in recent decades, we suspect that 
outsourcing has increased in part because newly outsourcing firms 
are able to replicate and improve on governance arrangements that 
have been used by pioneers. Thus, contracting technology influences 
the practice of outsourcing at the margin and therefore warrants 
further understanding. 
We hypothesize that the contract terms we have examined in this 
article can be understood as arrangements that help to reduce the 
“mundane” transactions costs—the costs of identifying, measuring, 
and compensating what is being transferred—as well as the 
opportunistic transactions costs that have been the focus of other 
studies.126 We suspect that much of the benefit of outsourcing 
contracts lies in the development and use of terms that reduce such 
mundane contracting costs by, say, developing standardized 
language and measurement tools. Such tools not only facilitate the 
day-to-day interaction between the parties to the outsourcing 
contract but also serve to “modularize” the activity, and thereby lay 
the groundwork for governing a contracting relationship with 
another contractual party on another activity down the road. 
 
 126. See Outsourcing Transactions, supra note 10 (focusing on the way that outsourcing 
contracts reduce agency costs); Gilson et al., supra note 11 (focusing on the special contracting 
problems that arise when firms attempt to outsource innovation and arguing that practices that 
increase the “switching costs” for parties to such arrangements have the effect of counteracting 
incentives to defect and facilitating cooperative behavior by locking the parties ever more 
tightly into the relationship). Gilson et al. appear to be comparing the cost of staying in the 
relationship with the contractual party to the cost associated with switching to a new 
contractual partner, rather than comparing that cost to the cost of keeping the activity in-
house.  
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B. Generalizing Crossing-Point Management in Outsourcing 
Although we derived our hypotheses about outsourcing 
contracts after looking at the sample of contracts we describe in this 
paper, the small number of contracts and the single law firm involved 
in negotiating each of them severely limits our ability to claim that 
our crossing-point management hypothesis can be generalized. As a 
preliminary check on whether the contract terms in our seven 
contracts are common in other outsourcing contracts, we turned to a 
collection of 60 outsourcing contracts compiled by Professor George 
Geis127 in order to begin to explore the extent to which the predicted 
types of contract clauses can be found in other outsourcing 
contracts. These contracts cover a fairly broad range of outsourced 
goods and services, including manufacturing, database management, 
call center services, human resource services, network management 
services, website development and maintenance services, check 
processing, and airplane maintenance. Professor Geis was kind 
enough to identify his contracts for us, and we have conducted an 
independent analysis of his contracts.  
All 60 contracts in the Geis sample were adopted by the parties 
between 1994 and 2007.128 Of these, 27 were signed in years 1994–
2000, and 33 were signed in 2001–2007.129 When we read the 
contracts in the sample, however, we learned that not all 60 of the 
contracts were outsourcing contracts in the sense that we use the 
term in this Article. Specifically, Professor Geis classified contracts as 
outsourcing contracts in cases where a firm had the internal 
capability to perform the contracted work,130 whereas we are 
interested in cases where work was previously actually performed in-
house and then later outsourced to another entity. For our analysis, 
we retained contracts in the Geis sample where it seemed plausible 
that the work was previously performed in-house but did not include 
contracts where it seemed unlikely that the work was previously 
performed in-house. In particular, we eliminated contracts where the 
service provider was promising to provide what seemed to be IT 
services wholly new to the customer. We also eliminated one 
contract where the parties were a parent and subsidiary because, 
 
 127. Outsourcing Transactions, supra note 10. 
 128. Id. at 258. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 257 & n.48. 
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given the close relatedness of the entities, it was not clear that work 
was being moved outside the boundary of the firm. Once we 
eliminated those contracts, we were left with 44 outsourcing 
contracts from the Geis sample. Of those 44, 20 were entered into 
between 1994 and 2000 and 24 were entered into between 2001 
and 2007.131 We looked for the presence of certain provisions in 
these 44 Geis contracts that we suggest above would help to thin 
crossing points, assist in the specification, standardization and/or 
measurement of performance, or help to manage thicker crossing 
points.  
Although this Geis-based sample is substantially larger than our 
sample, it is still not definitive, and we remain uncertain about 
whether we can generalize about the role and use of the terms we 
discussed in Part III for several reasons.  
First, the Geis sample of contracts might well be biased also. To 
be sure, they are less biased than the small sample that we studied 
closely in this project because they were negotiated and drafted by 
lawyers in a number of law firms. But the Geis sample might well 
exhibit other biases. For example, Geis constructed his sample from 
contracts that had been disclosed in firms’ financial disclosure 
documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.132 
This implies that his sample contracts all involved publicly traded 
firms on at least one side of the transaction. Moreover, SEC-
registered firms are only required to disclose such documents if they 
are “material” (which means they must be rather large compared 
with the firm’s overall operations) and not “highly-sensitive,” a 
condition that is subject to multiple interpretations.133 Therefore, 
this sample undoubtedly under-represents both small  
 
 
 
 131.   Id. at 258–59.  
 132. Id. at 256. 
 133. Other researchers who have attempted to survey or compile data on publicly 
disclosed contracts by SEC-registered companies have reported that disclosure is “highly 
irregular,” and that within the documents that have actually been disclosed, there is very little 
redaction, suggesting that the contents are not regarded as “highly sensitive” by the disclosing 
firms. See, e.g., Susan Maples, Finding Contracts on Securities Disclosures Databases, 
http://www.slideshare.net/pwyp/susan-maples-pwyp-montreal-conference-2009 (analyzing 
confidentiality clauses in disclosed contracts); Paul Wachter, Human Rights Clinic Exposes 
Corrupt Oil, Mining Contracts, http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_ 
events/2007/December07/Africa_oil.  
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contracts and outsourcing arrangements that the parties regard as 
highly sensitive.134  
Second, the vast majority of the Geis contracts involve domestic 
rather than international outsourcing.135 Once we conducted our 
own review of his contracts, we found that, of the original 60 
contracts, 59 Geis contracts provided addresses for customer and 
service provider; of these, 53 involved outsourcing between two U.S. 
firms, one involved two Canadian firms, one involved two UK firms, 
and one involved two German firms. Only three contracts in his 
sample are clearly international in scope.136 Thus, while our sample is 
biased in favor of international transactions, his appears to be biased 
against them. Still the comparison of these different samples could 
prove fruitful. 
Third, we have not so far searched through the Geis contracts 
exhaustively; instead, we identified a few provisions that we believe 
are unusual in other types of contracts but that we believe are 
important in managing the special nature of outsourcing  
relationships, and looked for the presence of those provisions in the 
contracts.  
And, fourth, we have not so far evaluated the Geis data with any 
sophisticated statistical methodologies. Instead, we simply compared 
the frequency of these provisions in contracts negotiated over time 
to get a sense of whether they seem to provide support for our 
predictions. A more sophisticated analysis of these contracts would 
be the subject of a follow-on project. 
As an example of a term that thins crossing points, we looked to 
see how many of the Geis contracts in each period identified specific 
personnel or positions within each company who would have the 
authority to negotiate work statements or changes. Of the 44 
contracts we categorize as outsourcing arrangements, 30, or 68.1%, 
had such clauses.137 Of the 20 contracts entered into from 1994 and 
2000, 13, or 65%, had such clauses, while 17, or 70.8%, of the 24 
 
 134. Highly sensitive contracts might be underrepresented because firms are sometimes 
able to obtain exceptions from the SEC so that they can avoid making highly sensitive 
contracts public.  
 135. Outsourcing Transactions, supra note 10, at 258. 
 136. The fact that only 3 of these contracts appear to present offshoring (not the 12 that 
Geis thought he had) might well explain Geis’ puzzling conclusion that offshoring has no 
effect on contract form. Id. at 291. 
 137. See infra Table 1. 
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contracts entered into from 2001 through 2007, had such clauses.138 
Although the sample of contracts is too small to draw hard 
conclusions, the significant portion and modest increase in the 
frequency of provisions designating specific personnel who would 
have authority to modify contract terms over time is consistent with 
the hypothesis that contracting parties may be discovering value in 
including them in their agreements.  
As examples of contract provisions that help to specify, 
standardize, or measure contract performance, we looked for the 
presence of (1) contract terms that identified or described the 
adoption of specific performance standards (as well as providing 
consequences for failure to comply with the standards), and (2) 
provisions that call for third-party benchmarking.  
Table 1 indicates that approximately 80% of the 44 Geis 
contracts had clauses adopting specific performance standards. In 
addition, the trend toward including these provisions was clear: in 
the earlier period, 65% of the contracts included explicit performance 
standards, and in the later period the frequency jumped to 91.6%.139 
One might expect an even higher percentage of outsourcing 
contracts to adopt performance standards, but it could be that many 
outsourcing arrangements defer a discussion of the performance 
standards to the individual work statements rather than placing them 
in the Master Agreement. In any event, nearly all contracts we 
studied that had been drafted since 2001 included explicit 
performance standards. 
Meanwhile, only 4 (20%) of the 20 contracts in the early period 
provided for third-party benchmarking and auditing, while 9 (37.5%) 
of 24 contracts signed in the later period have such clauses, 
according to Table 1.140 Here again, this is suggestive of some 
learning over time of the value of these provisions in outsourcing 
contracts. This increase in contract clause adoption could also reflect 
the rapid development in recent years of available third-party 
assurance services worldwide, providing an institutional basis to 
support reliance on third-party benchmarking and auditing.141 
Contractual requirements that the service provider develop a 
specific business continuity plan for ensuring performance in the 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Assurance Services, supra note 59, at 332–35. 
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event that external events threaten routine functioning of the parties 
under the contract strongly suggest that the parties believe that the 
customer firm will become highly dependent on the performance of 
the supplier firm once the customer winds down or eliminates its 
own internal capability of carrying out the activities that are the 
subject of the contract. Yet the Geis contracts do not reflect a high 
rate of usage of such clauses, with only 7 (35%) of the contracts in 
the earlier period, and 8 (33.3%) of the contracts in the later period 
containing such clauses.142 This low rate could be a function of the 
fact that very few of these contracts call for international 
outsourcing.  
In terms of managing thick crossing points, we looked for (1) 
customer rights of control over supplier personnel, and (2) 
termination services provisions.  
Regarding control rights, we searched the contracts for clauses 
that gave the customer rights of control over at least some of the 
service provider’s personnel, as well as clauses that specifically 
disclaim that these service provider personnel are employees of the 
customer. Not all outsourcing contracts will warrant such control 
rights. A customer that outsources the production of basic product 
inputs (i.e., set screws) presumably does not need to keep tabs on 
the employees producing those inputs. Like Baldwin’s pot hook 
example, some outsourcing could entail almost exclusively thin 
crossing points.143 Thus we would not expect to see these control 
rights in all outsourcing contracts, but we should see them in some. 
In those sample contracts drafted between 1994 and 2000, only 6, 
or 30%, contained provisions granting the customer control rights 
over service provider personnel, and 10 out of 20, or 50%, included a 
provision stating that personnel performing the outsourced work 
were not employees of the customer.144 For those contracts drafted 
in 2000 or later, the frequency of these provisions is somewhat 
higher.145 Nine, or 37.5%, of the 24 contracts in the second period 
give the customer personnel control rights, while 18 out of 24, or  
75%, include provisions denying that the personnel are employees of 
customer.146  
 
 142. See infra Table 1. 
 143. See supra pp. 121–22. 
 144. See infra Table 1. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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Finally, we looked for provisions requiring the service provider to 
perform services for the customer in the event of termination of the 
contract. Here we see an unchanging incidence in the use of these 
provisions: 9 of the 20 contracts in the earlier period, or 45%, 
included them while 11 of 24, or 45.8%, of the contracts entered 
into since then included them.147 In sum, the Geis contracts provide 
more general evidence, albeit not always strong, of parties using 
contract clauses in ways that we predict. If a trend can be discerned, 
it seems to be in favor of greater incorporation of most of these 
clauses over time, however. 
C. Litigation over Outsourcing Contracts 
What we do not know yet is whether the inclusion of these 
clauses makes the outsourcing relationship successful over time. Do 
the parties sustain their outsourcing relationship for longer periods 
on average if the contracts contain more of the specialized contract 
provisions we identify? Are they less likely to find themselves in 
disputes that lead to litigation? 
To our knowledge there has been little litigation over 
outsourcing agreements. We performed a search for litigation 
reported in the news media or through written judicial opinions and 
found only seven cases filed involving outsourcing contracts (six filed 
in U.S. courts and one in English courts). No doubt this number is 
underinclusive. Our efforts would have failed to uncover disputes 
that are litigated elsewhere and/or arbitrated without press 
attention, so it seems unlikely that these cases describe the universe 
of disputes. Nevertheless, they provide a glimpse into circumstances 
in which outsourcing has gone wrong.  
In all except one case, the service provider sued the customer, 
typically either because the outsourcing relationship had been 
terminated148 or because a portion of the outsourced activity had 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. In Computer Servs. Corp. v. Sears, for example, CSC filed suit against Sears to enjoin 
Sears’ termination of the parties’ outsourcing agreement. The parties disputed whether Sears’ 
termination was for cause, and they eventually settled their dispute in mediation, at which 
point Sears agreed to pay CSC an undisclosed sum. Carol Sliwa, Sears Ends IT Pact; CSC Seeks 
Payment, 39 COMPUTERWORLD, May 23, 2005, at 1, 55. In Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant 
Sav. Bank, Metavante sued for nonpayment of technology services provided and for the 
termination fee provided in the contract for convenience-based termination. No. 05-CV-1221, 
2009 WL 2058449 (E.D. Wis. July 6, 2009). Metavante won on all counts but was entitled to 
less than the full termination fee. Id. at *3–4. In Vertex Data Sci. Ltd. v. Powergen, Vertex sued 
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been taken back in house.149 In one case, Sourcecorp BPS, Inc. v. 
Kenwood Records Management, the service provider argued that a 
contract provision giving the service provider the exclusive right to 
perform the outsourced service precluded the customer from taking 
the work back in house.150 The court disagreed, finding that the 
exclusivity provision did no more than prevent the customer from 
using another outsource service provider.151 In at least four of the six 
cases involving partial or full termination, the service provider 
attempted to prevent the termination.152 In at least two of these 
cases, the service provider argued that the termination was for 
convenience rather than cause and the customer was therefore 
obligated to pay termination fees as provided in the contract.153 
In the case where a customer (Sprint) sued the service provider 
(IBM), Sprint argued that IBM owed it damages and free work 
because it failed to achieve agreed-upon productivity gains, failed to 
provide auditable data to support its claimed productivity gains, and 
failed to comply with contractually specified methods for measuring 
productivity.154 In all of these cases the parties end up fighting about 
the terms that we believe are characteristic of, if not unique to, 
 
Powergen seeking an injunction against Powergen’s announced termination (allegedly for a 
material breach) of the outsourcing arrangement. [2006] EWHC (Comm) 1340 (Eng.), 2006 
WL 2629805. 
 149. In Sourcecorp BPS, Inc. v. Kenwood Records Mgmt., Inc., Kenwood had outsourced 
document imaging services that it had contracted to provide to one of its clients.  548 F. Supp. 
2d 673, 674 (S.D. Iowa 2008). When Sourcecorp failed to adequately perform the required 
services, Kenwood performed some of the imaging itself. Id. at 677. In Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. 
Xerox, EDS agreed to perform IT services, application development and management services 
for Xerox, but thereafter Xerox pulled back the servicing of employee laptops. 709 N.Y.S.2d 
46, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). EDS sued to get its work back but later dropped the suit in 
exchange for a 5-year extension on the basic outsourcing arrangement. Id.; Nick Huber, EDS 
Drops Xerox Suit and Signs Up for Five More Years, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Dec. 16, 2001, at 
10. 
 150. Sourcecorp, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 678–79. 
 151. Id. at 680–81. The finding in this case, if it applies broadly, suggests that the 
customer corporation retains the right to bring the activity back in-house unless it specifically 
gives away that right in the contracts. We did not see any contracts that constrained the 
customer companies from undertaking the contracted activity itself again except by means of 
the general termination provisions. 
 152. Id.; EDS, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 47; Vertex, [2006] EWHC (Comm) 1340 (Eng.); Sliwa, 
supra note 148. 
 153. Metavante, 2009 WL 2058449; Sliwa, supra note 148. 
 154. The Sprint v. IBM case eventually settled without disclosure of its financial details. 
Randall S. Parks, Two Recent Cases Provide Some Rare Insight into What In-House Counsel 
Need To Know, 21 CORP. COUNS. 1 (2006). 
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outsourcing contracts—terms put in place to thin crossing points, to 
specify, standardize or measure, or to help the parties to manage the 
inevitable thickness of the relationship. Perhaps future litigation 
(which will likely be generated by the recent worldwide financial 
crisis and current recession) can tell us more about the effectiveness 
(or not) of the types of contract terms that we identify in this article. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The contracts we examined for this project are extraordinary 
documents that attempt to specify and codify detailed terms of 
relationships that had previously been structured and governed by 
fiat. One possible reason why the firms enter into these relationships 
is that these contract devices reduce transaction costs to the point 
that transactions are cheaper than in-house transfers for the firm. 
Another possibility, however, is that the firm may be better able to 
take advantage of other cost savings, such as reduced labor costs and 
economies of scale and specialization, that outsourcing can provide 
only if outsourcing contracts successfully develop to the point where 
they could both effectively thin crossing points and manage the 
remaining thickness of the outsourcing relationship. Over time, the 
key to effectively contracting for outsourcing may turn on the 
modularization of outsourcing contracts, the modularization of the 
processes and work to be performed over the life of the outsourcing 
relationship, and the development of adequate contracting 
infrastructure such as model terms, tested language, and the 
emergence of an inspection and auditing industry that can perform 
third-party evaluation and benchmarking.  
Our assessment of outsourcing contracts examined for this article 
challenges theoretical claims about the requirement of modularity for 
governance by contract, rather than by hierarchy, to be effective. 
Transactions do not have to occur only at extremely thin crossing 
points, because contracting techniques can be used to help the 
parties manage the vulnerability associated with contracting at 
relatively thick crossing points. Nonetheless, where parties attempt to 
insert firm boundaries at thick crossing points—places in the flow of 
productive activity where there is a high level of interconnection 
among the parties—new contracting technology must be used to 
manage relationships that in the past would have been managed by 
fiat within a hierarchy. Some of these contracts seem so complex, 
however, that they raise questions about whether they will, in fact, 
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reduce transactions costs and/or improve productivity over time. 
But as contracting technology evolves and develops, we expect to see 
more standardization of tools and terms that, in the long run, could 
make outsourcing increasingly feasible and attractive. 
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TABLE 1 
Contracts Signed in 1994 – 2000 
Total Contracts: 20 
 
Clauses 
Contracts 
Containing 
Such Clauses 
Number 
Percentage 
Specific Negotiating Personnel 
Adoption of Specific Performance Standards 
Third Party Benchmarking & Auditing 
Disaster Continuity Plan 
Personnel Control Rights 
SP Employees Not Client Employees 
Termination Services 
13 
13 
4 
7 
6 
10 
9 
65% 
65% 
20% 
35% 
30% 
50% 
45% 
 
Contracts Signed in 2001 – 2007 
Total Contracts: 24 
 
Clauses 
Contracts 
Containing 
Such Clauses 
Number 
Percentage 
Specific Negotiating Personnel 
Adoption of Specific Performance Standards 
Third Party Benchmarking & Auditing 
Disaster Continuity Plan 
Personnel Control Rights 
SP Employees Not Client Employees 
Termination Services 
17 
22 
9 
8 
9 
18 
11 
70.8% 
91.6% 
37.5% 
33.3% 
37.5% 
75% 
45.8% 
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APPENDIX 
The following is a description of seven contracts examined for 
this article. Documents 1.1.B and 1.1.C are based on a common 
form contract (which was Document 1.1.A in our files). Document 
2.5 was negotiated, but never signed because the customer company 
ultimately decided against outsourcing the project that was the 
object of the negotiations.  
Description of Documents: 
Document 1.1.B: Master Services Agreement, based on Contract 
I.1.A Form, by a large U.S.-based financial services firm with a 
service provider in India for call center services and customer services 
(for financial institution’s customers). Agreement was signed by both 
service provider parent company in India and service provider’s U.S.-
based subsidiary (with latter having joint and several liability) to 
ensure customer would have recourse against a U.S. party with U.S. 
assets. Expected value of services was tens of millions of dollars per 
year. Details of specific services to be worked out in separate 
Statements of Work. Term of Master Agreement is indefinite. Signed 
in 2004. 
Document 1.1.C: Master Services Agreement, based on Contract 
I.1.A Form, by a large U.S.-based financial services firm with a large, 
prominent U.S.-based services provider for finance and accounting 
services and human resources services. Service provider intended to 
provide services from its operations and personnel in the Philippines 
and India. Expected value of services over time was hundreds of 
millions of dollars. Details of specific services to be worked out in 
separate Statements of Work. Term of Master Agreement is 
indefinite. Signed in 2006. 
Document 1.2: Master Systems Implementation Services 
Agreement, by U.S.-based manufacturing company recently out of 
bankruptcy, with U.S. subsidiary of large Indian services company, 
for implementation work related to a new information technology 
(IT) system. Majority of software development, support, and related 
work was to be provided by personnel in India. Expected value of 
services was about $20 million. Details of specific services to be 
worked out in separate Statements of Work. Term of Master 
Agreement is 5 years, with up to 2 renewal terms. Signed in 2005. 
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Document 1.3: Master Services Agreement, by U.S.-based 
electric and gas utility company, with large U.S.-based service 
provider for a variety of IT services. Service provider was to use U.S.-
based personnel but had option to use personnel in Philippines and 
India for some services. Expected value of services was about $500 
billion. Details of specific services to be worked out in separate Work 
Agreements. Term of Master Agreement is 10 years. Signed in 2007. 
(This is longest contract in sample, at 234 pages including 14 
exhibits.) 
Document 2.4: Master Information Technology Services 
Agreement, by large U.S.-based financial services company, with a 
large U.S.-based services provider, for hosting of servers and 
applications support. Data center located in U.S., and majority of 
services to be provided by U.S.-based personnel, although service 
provider has the option to subcontract work and to send work 
offshore. Expected value of contract was about $100 million over life 
of contract. Details of specific services to be worked out in separate 
Supplements. Term of Master Agreement is indefinite except that it 
is to be a minimum of 6 months after the termination of any 
Supplement. Default term of Supplements is one year from 
execution date of each Supplement unless Supplement provides 
otherwise. Signed in 2004. 
Document 2.5: Master Services Agreement by large U.S.-based 
software company, with large Indian service provider, for 
development of software application for a particular industry. U.S.-
based subsidiary of service provider was to be a party, as well as 
Indian parent company. Details of specific services to be worked out 
in separate Statements of Work. Term was to be for 5 years, with 
automatic extensions unless customer decides against continuing. 
This contract was ultimately not signed because U.S.-based customer 
became concerned that the deal would help create a new competitor.  
Document 2.6: Master Services Agreement by large consumer 
electronics and communications company, with Scandinavian parent 
company and certain U.S. subsidiaries, for manufacturing of 
consumer electronics. Manufacturing was to be done in an Eastern 
European facility. Details of services and production to be specified 
in Work Orders and Statements of Work. Service provider may 
subcontract work only as specifically agreed by customer. Term of 
agreement was redacted. Signed in 2004. 
